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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN TROUBLED TIMES:
STABILIZING DEMOCRACY IN A SECOND-BEST
WORLD*
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF**
Debates over the role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy gravitate
to one of two poles. Either the debates are framed in terms of the power of courts
countering the outputs of a well-ordered legislative process, or they are framed
in terms of minority rights that are ever vulnerable to the tyranny of the
majority.
This Article parts company with the customary debate in two ways. First, the
inquiry focuses on the structures of democratic governance rather than the
relation between a governing majority and the rights of disfavored individuals
or minorities. Second, and contrary to the conditions assumed by critics of
judicial review such as Jeremy Waldron and Richard Bellamy, this Article aims
to look directly to the “contaminated” domain of our lived experience in the
moment rather than an idealized vision of well-ordered parliamentary
sovereignty. Especially in a time of populist challenges to the institutionalization
of democratic politics, the role of constitutional courts as potential brakes on the
politics of immediacy takes on greater and greater significance.
Relying on examples from jurisdictions around the world, this Article sets out
three types of interventions ranging in terms of how problematic they are for
democratic governance. First is the use of constitutional review to prevent
entrenched officeholders from undermining their electoral accountability, as seen
in places as far removed as Taiwan and North Carolina. The second is the role
of court interventions to bolster what is termed the “soft power” of democracy in
which institutional norms compel a politics of negotiation and compromise.
Finally, there is the temptation for courts to substitute judicial authority for
failing state competence of democracies in general, and of the legislative branches
in particular.
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** Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law. My thanks to
Pablo de Greiff, Yvonne Tew, and Po Jen Yap for comments on the draft, and to Elaine Andersen,
Tim Duncheon, Tim Haase, and Hannah Miles for research assistance. I owe a special thanks to Jeremy
Waldron for many years of fruitful collegial exchanges.
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In each case, this Article examines judicial review to determine to what extent
the judiciary can serve as an institutional buffer in protecting democracy against
systemic failure, sometimes on matters that may pertain to fundamental liberties
but more often on questions of the exercise of governmental authority. The
question here is whether, in times of challenge to democratic functioning, the
judiciary may play a stabilizing role in warding off temporary political
expedients that threaten governmental integrity. The term “stabilization”
invokes the role of a central banker charged with maintaining fiscal integrity in
the face of inevitable partisan demands for unsustainable short-term returns. In
turn, the inquiry is whether judicial interventions in defense of the structural
integrity of democratic rule can be thought of in similar terms of conservatorship
by a semi-independent entity and, in turn, how this institutional role of the
judiciary might be utilized in times of systemic stress.
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INTRODUCTION
Too much American constitutional law engages a ritualized set of
exchanges over judicial review. Even when stripped of the normative valence as
a defense or critique of Brown, or Roe, or Lochner, or Dred Scott, the arguments
loop back onto themselves. At bottom is always the concern over the legitimacy
of judicial arrogation of the power to set aside the desired objectives of the
democratically accountable political branches. The countermajoritarian
dilemma is the shorthand for the peculiar ability of the weakest branch of
government to claim a privileged, if not monopolistic, power to invoke
constitutional authority as the supreme law of the land. This Article argues that
judicial review may play a critical role in stabilizing democratic governance for
reasons not having to do with rights preservation or with the usurpation of
political authority from the elected branches. All democracies carry the seeds of
their own fragility, and this Article aims to examine how judicial review can
provide stability when these seeds take root. Rather than assume away threats
to democratic order, this Article will ground itself in the real, imperfect world
of threatened democracy.
More than a half century after Alexander Bickel published his fielddefining monograph, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics,1 the debates in American constitutional law continue unabated.
Oddly, the American “obsession,” as framed by Barry Friedman,2 persists even
as the rest of the democratic world has assumed the centrality of constitutional
courts in framing the post-World War II democratic order. All postwar
democracies feature an apex court with the power to review the constitutionality
of legislation, a marked departure from the status quo prior to World War II,
in which the United States stood largely isolated in the scope of its judicial
power of constitutional invalidation of legislation.3 Indeed, in the “third wave”4
of democratic creation after the fall of the Soviet Union, the centrality and
power of these courts has only increased.5 As set out in my work, Fragile

1. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST D ANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962) (“The authority to determine the meaning and application of a
written constitution is nowhere defined or even mentioned in the document itself. This is not to say
that the power of judicial review cannot be placed in the Constitution; merely that it cannot be found
there.”).
2. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
3. DIETER GRIMM, CONSTITUTIONALISM: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 199 (2016).
4. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 3–5 (1991).
5. Although it is hard to measure in the full light of actual practice, one estimate is that over
eighty percent of countries now have a high court with the judicial review authority to strike down
offending legislation. Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?,
30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 587, 587 (2013).
AT THE
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Democracies,6 there is not much logic in creating a tribunal with jurisdiction
targeted at the constitutionality of governmental conduct if the aim is not to
invite judicial review of the political branches.7 One does not give a carpenter a
hammer without anticipating that he will soon start finding nails.
And yet, the customary debate persists. The current malaise of democratic
governance is a good time to reengage the questions over the role of judicial
review, understood here as the institutional capacity of an apex court to limit
the boundaries of political choice. The analytic impulse that follows is exactly
the opposite of the organizing principle for much of the debate about judicial
oversight. My colleague Jeremy Waldron forcefully defines the core theoretical
debate as one searching for “some general understanding, uncontaminated by
the cultural, historical, and political preoccupations of each society.”8 Such an
approach assumes “a democratic culture and electoral and legislative institutions
in reasonably good working order”9 as a precondition to the question of “what
reason can there be for wanting to set up a nonelective process to review and
sometimes override the work that the legislature has done?”10 For another
leading critic of judicial intervention, Richard Bellamy, the ideal condition
could be threatened by declines in turnout and party membership, an electorate
that is “too vast and diverse,” and a scale of government “too large for citizens
to be able effectively to relate to each other.”11 For both Waldron and Bellamy,
so long as the democratic preconditions are met, only legislatures provide “an
equitable process for deciding between individuals’ often competing claims.”12
As Bellamy elaborates, “the basic components of such an arrangement consist
in citizens having an equal vote in common elections where political parties
compete for the people’s vote and electoral and legislative decisions are made
by majority rule.”13
For Bellamy, the debate over judicial constitutionalism begins
axiomatically with the proposition that “[c]entral to legal constitutionalism is
the idea of constitutional rights.”14 This is a common assumption shared across
the various positions on judicial review. On the other side of the ledger,
arguments for judicial intervention to overcome the deficiencies of democratic

6. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL C OURTS 189–213 (2015).

DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA

7. Id.
8. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE. L.J. 1346, 1352 (2006)
[hereinafter Waldron, Core of the Case].
9. Id. at 1362.
10. Id.
11. RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENSE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 260–61 (2007).
12. Id. at 212; see Waldron, Core of the Case, supra note 8, at 1346.
13. BELLAMY, supra note 11, at 219.
14. Id. at 15.
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processes usually begin (and end) with the key concern that a too-powerful
majority will see no electoral incentive to safeguard the interests of a disfavored
minority. On this view, judicial review invoking a higher-order legal authority
is a necessary corrective for the concern over discrete and insular minorities
facing the disregard of a tyrannous majority. Even here, the discussion takes on
a stylized character at high levels of abstraction. As Theunis Roux notes, “[T]he
wide array of pathologies in the functioning of representative institutions,
including the poor quality of deliberation in such institutions, makes it
impossible to generalise about the relative merits of judicial versus legislative
attention to rights.”15
This Article parts company with the customary debate in two key ways.
First, this Article addresses the structures of democratic governance rather than
the relation between a governing majority and the rights of disfavored
individuals or minorities. Judicial review is examined to determine to what
extent the judiciary can serve as an institutional buffer in protecting democracy
against systemic failure, sometimes on matters that may pertain to fundamental
liberties, but more often on questions of the exercise of governmental authority.
The question here is whether in times of challenge to democratic functioning
the judiciary may play a stabilizing role in warding off temporary political
expedients that threaten governmental integrity.
Judicial review is one of many mechanisms that remove from direct and
immediate democratic accountability institutions that may be predictability
compromised in the press of political expediency. The term “stabilization”
invokes the role of a central banker charged with maintaining fiscal integrity in
the face of inevitable partisan demands for unsustainable short-term returns. In
turn, the inquiry is whether judicial interventions in defense of the structural
integrity of democratic rule can be thought in similar terms of conservatorship
by a semi-independent entity.
The second point of departure follows, and here the aim is to look directly
to the “contaminated” domain of our lived experience in the moment. To quote
Roux again, “The question whether judicial review would be morally justified
if various assumptions hold is in any case not the question that these societies
actually confront.”16 The critical inquiry is not an idealized world of healthy
parliamentary exchange but the current disabilities of democratic governance in
nearly all states ruled by popular sovereignty. Were we to live among the angels,
as Madison once noted, institutional constraints would be unnecessary.17 In the
second-best domain of real-world conflict and uncertainty, the discussion
15. Theunis Roux, In Defence of Empirical Entanglement: The Methodological Flaw in Waldron’s Case
Against Judicial Review, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF DELIBERATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
203, 203 (Ron Levy et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Roux, In Defence of Empirical Entanglement].
16. Id. at 209.
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
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should move beyond Platonic ideals.18 Rather than assuming the operation of a
healthy democracy running on all of its institutional gears, I begin with the realworld observation that all is not well in the house of democratic governance. In
accepting neither the health of democracy nor the centrality-of-rights concerns
as the analytic point of departure, it is my aim to take the debate over judicial
review off of its customary theoretical mooring and ground it in the messy
reality of lived experience.
Each point of departure asks not about the idealized vision of how
individual rights are best protected in a democratic culture but rather what the
institutional role of the judiciary might be in times of systemic stress. This alters
the analytic framework substantially. Virtually the entire debate over judicial
review is framed in the language of rights discourse that dominated
constitutional thought in the second half of the twentieth century. The rights
focus is not only jurisprudential, most notably in the work of Ronald Dworkin,19
but is also found in the practical application of constitutional adjudication in
the American context. Whether the object of debate is Brown20 or Roe21 or
Heller,22 the claim is always that certain rights are so centrally guaranteed to the
citizenry that the judiciary not only may, but indeed must, be the Herculean
guarantor of the deepest constitutional values of the society. As a general
matter, the rights claims reject Waldron’s invitation to compare the practical
and legitimacy gains from allowing the democratic institutions of the society to
take up the definitional dimensions of citizenship. Certain matters are simply
outside the democratic bargain once embroidered as human rights or
constitutional entitlements.
The argument about a structural role for judicial engagement is not new.
It was anticipated in John Hart Ely’s classic recounting of the Carolene Products
footnote to focus less on the characterization of discrete and insular minorities
and more on the conditions disabling the capacity for democratic self-repair.23
For Ely, the critical justification for judicial intervention was the preservation

18. See Mark Tushnet, How Different are Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core Cases For and Against Judicial
Review?, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 49 (2010) (comparing core cases for and against judicial
review and concluding that the authors’ “different dispositions” lead them to “characterize their quite
similar positions in [a] dramatic ‘against-for’ manner”).
19. See, e.g., RONALD D WORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 4 (1977) (discussing the
persistent focus on jurisprudence); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1–3 (1986) (discussing judicial
power and interpretation).
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
21. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
23. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77
(1980).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2019)

2019]

JUDICIAL REVIEW

7

of democratic competition and electoral accountability.24 In turn, the focus on
the preservation of the structural integrity of democracy was the key move in
recapturing a slice of American constitutional law under the rubric of the law of
democracy.25 And, as Rosalind Dixon noted, that same approach underlies the
extension of a non-rights-based look at the role of constitutional courts in fragile
democracies—what she termed the international turn in the law of democracy
canon.26
Less evident is the other half of the attack on judicial review. Here the
question is what happens if democracy is not in full working order? Does it
make a difference for the critics of judicial review if the question is not posed
in the first-best world of perfectly working institutions, but rather in the
second-best world in which democratic institutions are failing? The world of
the second best is always treacherous. But even economists willing to entrust
just about all human engagements to self-realizing market exchanges reserve a
special place for market failure. Despite the many debates over when and under
what circumstances markets do indeed fail, even the most ardent of free
marketeers recognize the role for a regulatory intervention when markets are
dominated by noninternalizable externalities, by underproduction of public
goods, or by anticompetitive collusive behavior.27 Is there a corresponding
concept of democratic failure, conditions that command an institutional
response to the inability of democratic institutions to play their assigned role?
Shifting the debate over judicial review into the domain of the second best
does not yield easy answers about how far judicial intervention may go in the
name of curing institutional process failure. The most sophisticated challenge
to democratic integrity comes in the powerful and disturbing application of
public choice theory by Justice Luis Roberto Barroso of the Supreme Federal
Court of Brazil (“STF”).28 For Justice Barroso, institutional failure is not an

24. Id.
25. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 8–9 (5th ed. 2016).
26. See Rosalind Dixon, ‘Politics as Markets’ Goes Global, JOTWELL (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://intl.jotwell.com/politics-as-markets-goes-global/ [https://perma.cc/Z5ZH-66JS] (reviewing
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (2015)); see also ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 189–213.
27. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL M ARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM
AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 48 (2018) (“Western liberals concluded that capitalism,
whatever its limitations, was the superior method of economic organization. The best approach to
monopoly was antitrust law, . . . regulation, and limited state ownership in the most important
industries.”).
28. Luís Roberto Barroso, Reason Without Vote: The Representative and Majoritarian Function of
Constitutional Courts, in DEMOCRATIZING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71, 79–80 (Thomas Bustamante &
Bernado Gonçalves Fernandes eds., 2016) [hereinafter Barroso, Reason Without Vote]; see Luís Roberto
Barroso, Countermajoritarian, Representative, and Enlightened: The Roles of Constitutional Courts in
Democracies, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 128 (2019) [hereinafter Barroso, Countermajoritarian] (“[I]t should
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episodic feature of legislative democracy but an ever-present attribute of the
ability of concentrated sectional claims to defeat the dissipated public interest
in the battle for public goods.29 Brazil may represent an extreme example30 with
more than a third of the national legislature under indictment for corruption;31
with the last three presidents successively in prison,32 impeached,33 and having
left office with a five percent approval rating in the face of massive corruption
scandals;34 and with a current president pushing the boundaries of the spectrum
of acceptable democratic leaders.35 But Barroso does not raise an episodic
question about Brazil in a moment of political crisis. Rather, he offers a wellgrounded concern about special interest capture of the regulatory capacity of
democratic states.36 If such capture is endemic to the political branches, posits
Barroso, then perhaps the judiciary is the sole branch immune from political
distortions.37 From this follows a stirring defense of the social rights activism of
some of the more engaged apex courts around the world, notably Brazil and
Colombia.38
My aim here is to resist both of these polar roles for the judiciary as
exemplified by Waldron and Bellamy on one end and Barroso on the other. I
want neither passivity in the hope that idealized visions of parliamentary
sovereignty will emerge nor overarching intervention into the allocation of
not be surprising that the Supreme Court, though not as a general rule, functions as an interpreter of
social sentiment.”).
29. Barroso, Countermajoritarian, supra note 28, at 128–29.
30. Jonathan Watts, Operation Car Wash: Is This the Biggest Corruption Scandal in History?,
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-carwash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history [https://perma.cc/TTH9-DX97].
31. See Ricardo Brito & Lisandra Paraguassu, Brazil Judge Orders Corruption Probe into a Third of
Temer’s Cabinet, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-probesidUSKBN17D2KB?il=0 [https://perma.cc/TW2K-SXQ8].
32. Manuela Andreoni, Ernesto Londoño & Shasta Darlington, Ex-President ‘Lula’ of Brazil
Surrenders
to
Serve
12-Year
Jail
Term,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/world/americas/brazil-lula-surrenders-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva.html [https://perma.cc/UD7C-9MF8 (dark archive)].
33. Catherine E. Shoichet & Euan McKirdy, Brazil’s Senate Ousts Dilma Rousseff in Impeachment
Vote, CNN (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/americas/brazil-rousseff-impeachmentvote/index.html [https://perma.cc/6UR5-DZ2X].
34. Lisandra Paraguassú & Anthony Boadle, Brazil President’s Popularity Mired at Lows in Election
Year: Poll, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-poll/brazilpresidents-popularity-mired-at-lows-in-election-year-poll-idUSKCN1HC1RL
[https://perma.cc/3567-8CAM] (noting that then-President Michel Temer’s approval rating had
dropped to five percent).
35. See generally Claire Felter & Rocio Cara Labrador, Brazil’s Corruption Fallout, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils-corruption-fallout
[https://perma.cc/3FHL-M6CD (dark archive)] (detailing corruption in Brazil’s top levels of
government).
36. Barroso, Countermajoritarian, supra note 28, at 128–29.
37. Id. at 129–30.
38. Id. at 130–33.
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government services and resources in the name of state incapacity. Hopefully,
there is a middle ground in which democratic debility necessitates heightened
judicial scrutiny without substituting judicial command for democratic selfgovernance. In particular, the rise of populist demands, fueled by a
noninstitutional sense of a plebiscitary mandate, makes the modern role of the
judiciary an all the more pressing issue.
This Article presents three different circumstances in which democracies
may be under serious challenge: when attempts are made to end or frustrate
electoral accountability of the governors, when the norms of democratic
governance are undermined, and when there is manifest disregard for the
interests of predictable sectors of the population. When executive overreach,
populist extremism, or loss of legislative competence pushes courts into the
breach, the need for judicial intermediation presents itself most directly. What
follows is an attempt to sort through the messy reality of judicial review as a
response to democratic incapacity in the unfortunately very real world that
surrounds us.
I. ASSUMING A WELL-FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY, OR NOT
In addressing the role of judicial review in the second-best world of
political reality, it is useful to highlight the points of departure between the
idealized versions of democratic governance and what we actually have. The
title of this Article speaks of “troubled times,” and some attention needs to be
directed at how the troubles play out in terms of the demands made upon the
judiciary.
A.

Idealized Democracies

There is great value in examining idealized social engagements to elucidate
the nature of the lived experience. Most famously, Ronald Coase explored the
behavior of firms in a hypothesized world free of transactions costs, not so as to
claim that such a world did or should exist, but in order to examine how firms
behave in response to the reality of transactional hurdles in every aspect of their
existence.39 In Waldron’s case, the equivalent transaction-cost-less democratic
order is characterized thusly:
This society has a broadly democratic political system with universal
adult suffrage, and it has a representative legislature, to which elections
are held on a fair and regular basis. I assume that this legislature is a large
deliberative body, accustomed to dealing with difficult issues, including
important issues of justice and social policy. The legislators deliberate
and vote on public issues, and the procedures for lawmaking are elaborate
39. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 395 (1937); R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–19 (1960).
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and responsible, and incorporate various safeguards, such as
bicameralism, robust committee scrutiny, and multiple levels of
consideration, debate, and voting. I assume that these processes connect
both formally (through public hearings and consultation procedures) and
informally with wider debates in the society.40
These preconditions are certainly recognizable from contemporary
democracies, at least aspirationally. The list understates the critical role
assumed by intermediary institutions, most notably political parties. Indeed, as
famously formulated by E.E. Schattschneider, “political parties created
democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the
parties.”41 For Waldron, parties are more the mechanism for legislators to rise
above parochial demands,42 as famously formulated by Edmund Burke in his
address to the electors of Bristol.43
On the other hand, the demand for bicameralism as a necessary condition
is a bit odd, as it would exclude from the debate Israel and New Zealand and
allow for the inclusion of Great Britain only by virtue of the House of Lords,
an institution certainly lacking in democratic pedigree.44 If democratic
legitimacy emerges from the open process of selection of the governors by the
governed, the exacting specificity of bicameralism appears out of place.
On closer inspection, however, the inclusion of bicameralism and the
diminished role of political parties is not so much idiosyncratic or mistaken as
unexplained.45 Waldron’s exclusive focus on judicial review results in the
understatement of any theory as to what these other institutional preconditions
are supposed to accomplish. Let me now essay to fill in the picture of proper
democratic governance against which judicial intervention is juxtaposed.
There are two organizing principles to Waldron’s list of democratic
preconditions. One may take issue with the bill of particulars, and certainly
there are long historic debates about “thin” versions of democracy turning on
elections with a broad franchise versus “thick” versions that carry an expandable
list of social rights, minimum entitlements, and other elements that enrich civic
40. Waldron, Core of the Case, supra note 8, at 1361.
41. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1 (9th prtg. 1959).
42. Waldron, Core of the Case, supra note 8, at 1361 (“I assume too that there are political parties,
and that legislators’ party affiliations are key to their taking a view that ranges more broadly than the
interests and opinions of their immediate constituents.”). By contrast, Richard Bellamy offers a more
classic account of parties as mediating competing interests and helping stabilize agenda setting in the
legislative arena. BELLAMY, supra note 11, at 236–37 (citing Michael D. McDonald, Silvia M. Mendes
& Ian Budge, What Are Elections For? Conferring the Median Mandate, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 1–26
(2004)).
43. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in 2 THE WORKS OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 89, 94–98 (London, John C. Nimmo ed., 1887).
44. JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 72–73
(2016) [hereinafter WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY].
45. For a more theoretical grounding for bicameralism, see id. at 72–92.
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life.46 Whether on Waldron’s account or under a thicker version of democratic
society, we can distinguish between the process of electoral choice of governors
and the mechanisms that steer the governors toward a respect for the dignity of
all citizens.
As with most accounts of democracy, Waldron begins with the central role
of elections and the franchise.47 The participation of the citizenry in selfgovernance through the electoral process sets the foundation for democracy.
Elections allow the citizens to assess retrospectively the success of the most
recent governors. Universal suffrage and periodic elections are elements that
contribute to a Schumpetarian obligation of the governors to be accountable to
the citizenry48 as well as the capacity of the citizenry to respond retroactively
by “throwing the rascals out.”49 Indeed, for political scientists such as Adam
Przeworski and his collaborators, the fact of having at least twice removed
incumbent politicians by electoral means is the operational definition of
democracy.50 The voting aspect offers citizens the renewal of consent, in
Bernard Manin’s formulation,51 such that the continued exercise of state
authority may assume political legitimacy. To this might be added a series of
rights guarantees that are essential to democratic choice, including freedoms of
speech and press, the capacity to organize political parties, and the ability to
assemble in furtherance of political expression. This first set of principles is well
trod in political theory and is premised on the central role of citizen voting that
underlies any theory of democracy. These are the structural components of
democratic governance, including the familiar separation of powers among
branches of government that have different electoral constituencies together
with formal rights guarantees established through constitutional design.
Less clearly identified is the second set of preconditions. Requirements of
bicameralism, ongoing debate, committee structures, and the like do not go to
the process values of accountability. These are elements of a concern about
democratic governance rather than democratic election. With the exception of
bicameralism, these tend not to be constitutionally entrenched but emerge
46. See D AVID F. J. CAMPBELL, THE BASIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEMOCRACY RANKING OF
THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY 20 (2008) (reviewing various definitions of democracy ranging from
“thin” to “thick”).
47. WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 125–26.
48. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (Routledge
2010) (1943) (“[T]he role of the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate body which
in turn will produce a national executive or government . . . . [T]he democratic method is that
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”).
49. G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY:
MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 47 (2000).
50. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE W ORLD, 1950–1990, at 18–30 (2000).
51. BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 176 (1997).
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instead from trial and error and the resulting lived institutional experience of
particular democratic governments. Each of the listed attributes, and others
such as filibuster rules and supermajority requirements for certain legislative
enactments, are efforts to compel a broader consensus for governance. Elections
serve primarily to create a momentary majority (or plurality) that will assume
office. Rules concerning how governmental power will be exercised define the
limits of office and the requirements of political consensus. In turn, these
governance rules evince a substantive concern with moderation and stability in
the discharge of governmental functions.
Democracies allow a broad swath of private citizen behavior and
decisionmaking. Legitimate governance offers citizens the ability to carry on
ordering their private affairs under a knowable set of societal commitments to
a rule of law. Ultimately, law seeks to permit the citizenry to form justifiable
expectations about rights, security, and freedom from arbitrary state action.
Unlike plebiscitary governance, which may permit radical swings in
programmatic commitments, institutionalized democratic governance provides
what James Madison hailed as the virtues of “filtration” of popular sentiment
through institutional intermediation.52 Committee structures, bicameralism,
staggered election cycles, federalism, and separation of powers are instruments
that delay the implementation of momentary popular preferences until they
command sufficient support, measured in terms of both the intensity of the
majority commitment and its endurance over time. In the perhaps apocryphal
exchange between George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, Washington
likened the need for a second legislative chamber to Jefferson’s custom of
pouring hot coffee from cup to saucer: after passage by the popularly
accountable House, explained Washington, “we pour our legislation into the
Senatorial saucer to cool it.”53
From this perspective, two aims are served by submitting democratic
governance to constitutional constraints. Constitutionalism serves to secure
both the process values of periodic accountability and the substantive aim of
checking the ability of a majority to get its political way too readily.54 But
constitutional law does only part of the work. The formal structures of
52. NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, PARTISAN,
PRESIDENT 112–15 (2017).
53. CHARLES W ARREN, THE M AKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 194 (1928).
54. See, e.g., Andrew Geddis, Parliamentary Government in New Zealand: Lines of Continuity and
Moments of Change, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 99, 99–118 (2016) (examining New Zealand’s government
and arguing that New Zealand has “an ongoing popular constitutional preference for a supreme
legislature and active government primarily restrained through accountability to the general public”);
see also Jack H. Nagel, Expanding the Spectrum of Democracies: Reflections on Proportional Representation in
New Zealand, in DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONS 113, 113–14 (Markus M. L. Crepaz, Thomas A.
Koelble & David Wilsford eds., 2000) (discussing New Zealand’s electoral reform of proportional
representation).
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governance, such as the composition of the legislative branch and the formal
powers of the executive, are customarily specified in the formal writing of a
constitution. Were a government to suspend the operation of parliament, or
override judicial review altogether,55 there would be little question that any
claim to democratic legitimacy would be foregone for the executive that pursues
such a course, with or without tanks in the street. This is the narrow view of
constitutional democracy as providing for a series of structural guarantees that
are often the subject of judicial oversight.56
But other important features of democratic stability are less evident,
ranging from the internal procedures of the parliament to such measures as the
filibuster or the “blue slip” in the American Senate, all mechanisms that should
compel negotiation and compromise between the majority and the minority.
These latter mechanisms go not to the core principle of electoral accountability
but to the discharge of responsible governance. These norms of restraint form
the “spirit” of democratic governance, to borrow from Montesquieu,57 without
which political stability could not exist. Thus, from Waldron, we have concern
that New Zealand’s practice of allowing a unicameral legislature strays from the
deliberative ideal by allowing proposed legislation to be “enacted in a single
sitting, and that means we lose the point of having successive layers of debate
and voting, which is supposed to be a way of slowing down the enactment of a
Bill, a kind of compulsory waiting period.”58
The existence of the above two sets of preconditions for stable democratic
governance does not speak for or against judicial review. These are instead
mechanisms that temper the democratic necessity of majoritarian rule by
diminishing the risk of the tyranny of that same majority. Among this set of
accommodations may be found the guarantees of quality of life for all citizens
that thicken some accounts of democratic legitimacy. The mechanisms that
compel democracies to care for all their citizens, including those unable to
prevail in the electoral arena, may be thought of as the “soft power” of a
constitutional democracy. For classic thinkers like Montesquieu, “[T]he hard
architecture of political institutions might be enough to constrain overreaching
power—that constitutional design was not unlike an engineering problem
. . . .”59 In practice, however, successful democracies embroider the hard
55. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency
Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210, 216, 232 (2004).
56. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945–46 (1983) (discussing Article I of the United
States Constitution and the importance of separation of powers).
57. See generally BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al.
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
58. Jeremy Waldron, Compared to What? Judicial Activism and New Zealand’s Parliament, 2005 N.Z.
L.J. 441, 442 [hereinafter Waldron, Compared to What?].
59. STEVEN LEVITSKY & D ANIEL ZIBLATT , HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 212 (2018)
(characterizing Baron de Montesquieu’s 1748 treatise, The Spirit of the Laws).
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architecture with a series of norms and institutionalized practices that slow
down the risk of partisan exuberance and allow for stable governance over time
and over shifting election results.
B.

Real Democracies

The procedures and conditions that emerge from how democracies
actually work are the “guardrails” of modern democratic governance, in
Levitsky and Ziblatt’s useful formulation, 60 that provide important constraints
on majoritarian excess far beyond the formal structures of constitutionally
mandated institutions. Indeed, the erosion of such soft power in the face of
plebiscite-like demands for the immediate satisfaction of majoritarian demands
may be the greatest contemporary threat to democracy. With the weakness of
the legislative branches and the rise of the executive, these “guardrails” may
prove vulnerable to the populist wave, which in critical ways overwhelms the
customary limitations on the exercise of constitutional power. These guardrails
are somewhat evident in the selection process that defines democratic culture.
But there are further guardrails that check the exercise of democratic authority
by those elected in such a way as to restrain extremism. When these customary
limits and conditions are threatened, as they often are in the messy and secondbest realm of lived experience, the question of what to do next cannot be
answered by assuming the threats do not exist.
As I have addressed elsewhere,61 the cooling function of legislative debate
and accommodation is in disrepair, and institutional checks on temptations for
momentary excess must come from elsewhere. Renata Uitz explains that
executive power grows when legislatures fail to exercise this cooling function
and resolve difficult questions:
The powers of the executive branch to execute the laws . . . are neither
self-standing, nor self-explanatory. Rather they are part of a complex
web of legislative and executive powers, mended by the judiciary and
extended by the political branches based on practical needs, fears, and
personal ambitions. Complexity leads to complication and complications
are left unresolved under the banner of being (too) complex. This
becomes the convenient source of unstoppable executive overreach.62

60. Id. at 97–117.
61. See Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy’s Deficits, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 485, 499 (2018) [hereinafter
Issacharoff, Democracy’s Deficits].
62. ANDRÁS SAJÓ & RENATA UITZ, THE CONSTITUTION OF FREEDOM: AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 284–85 (2017); see also Renata Uitz, Courts and the Expansion of
Executive Power: Making the Constitution Matter, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS: BETWEEN THE GLOBAL NORTH AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 85, 89 (David Bilchitz &
David Landau eds., 2018).
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Modern democracies are almost invariably commanded from above by
executive authority. In contemporary politics, the risk of undermining norms
of governance comes not only from populist insurgents around the world but
also from the breakdown of legislatively focused politics. Morris Fiorina
compellingly establishes that, in the context of U.S. politics—“given the
American constitutional system with its separation of powers, checks and
balances, and federalism—a party would have to win and retain an
overwhelming majority to implement its platform given all the veto points that
can be utilized by the opposition.”63 From this, Fiorina concludes that “[f]ailure
to win and hold such . . . majorities produces the stalemate and gridlock that
characterize contemporary politics.”64
Perhaps. But looking away from the legislative arena, where indeed
stalemate and gridlock reign, the actual exercise of political power looks more
complicated. Fiorina grounds his analysis in the failure of the legislative branch
to play its suited role. The historic premise of the constitutional democracies of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the primacy of the legislative branch,
denominated by the Article I power in the U.S. setting. Legislative weakness
invites capture of government authority by the executive, a tendency for policy
to be initiated through regulation or decree rather than legislation. These
executive-dominated governments look to elections as a mandate rather than as
the normal process of parliamentary ups and downs.65 And these executives see
the legislature as an obstacle to moving ahead with executive prerogatives. A
legislature that does not deliver risks being overwhelmed by the executive
branch. It does not matter that legislative inaction may result from the
fracturing of the political parties capable of negotiating for the public good, the
sheer dysfunction of the legislature, a political disagreement with the agenda of
the executive, or the inability to cohere on a policy initiative in the face of
internal political disagreement. An executive riding a populist wave would not
distinguish among the sources of legislative inaction and would instead see each
sign of legislative reprobation as an unwarranted threat to the executive’s
electoral mandate.
Without the primacy of legislative authority, the legitimacy and support
of democratic governance erodes. The ensuing period of “democratic decline”
allows a populist leader to launch “a concerted and sustained attack on
institutions whose job it is to check his actions or on rules that hold him to
account.”66 As Kim Lane Scheppele explains, such a populist leader “does so in
63. MORRIS P. F IORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: POLARIZATION, PARTY SORTING, AND
POLITICAL STALEMATE 85 (2017).
64. Id.
65. See Robert Dahl, Myth of the Presidential Mandate, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 355, 360 (1990).
66. Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 549 (2018) [hereinafter
Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism].
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the name of his democratic mandate. Loosening the bonds of constitutional
constraint on executive power through legal reform is the first sign of the
autocratic legalist.”67
Separating the functions of democratic election from democratic
governance highlights the risk posed by legislative decline. Running a successful
democracy is not simply a matter of getting elected but of delivering the goods,
of getting things done well. Governments must frequently trade off the
immediate satisfaction of demands for the long-term good, whether in
infrastructure investments, in wartime privation, or in not indulging in
inflationary monetary expansion. The processes of electoral accountability
speak primarily to government formation and re-formation. But successful
governance is a longer project and state capabilities develop over time. The
epistemic challenge to wise democratic stewardship is not a matter of electoral
accountability alone but of institutionalized state competence that must at times
resist or cool the temporary ardor of the electorate.68
Institutional failure invites erosion of democratic norms through efforts to
circumvent the process accountability aspects of democratic election or through
efforts to unwind the institutional constraints that accompany successful
democratic governance. This leads to the core of the argument for judicial
scrutiny as a check in periods of democratic decline. The case for judicial
intervention is more apparent in the case of efforts to defeat the structural
protections of democratic accountability. Whether the judiciary can restore the
guardrails of democratic governance is a harder question. And, finally, there is
the question whether, once the boundary is crossed for the judicial mandate to
include questions of governance, there is a stopping point short of judicial
claims to oversee the policy outcomes that ensue. Once the assumption of
properly functioning legislative supremacy is relaxed, the leading arguments
against judicial review stumble badly when measured against the unfortunately
imperfect real world.
II. BASIC STRUCTURES AT PERIL
In the manner that foxes should not be posted at the henhouse door, so it
is that deference to the legislative process cannot serve as the answer to
systematic assaults on the process of electoral accountability.69 There may be
great dignity, at least ideally, in the deliberation offered in the legislative
67. Id.
68. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: FROM PREHUMAN T IMES TO
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 472 (2011) (noting that state competence and the liberal rule of law has
often been a necessary predecessor for democracy itself).
69. Roux puts it far too politely when he writes: “There is also considerable scope for
disagreement about . . . whether legislatures have the capacity for self-correction.” Roux, In Defence of
Empirical Entanglement, supra note 15, at 208.
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setting. But there is no dignity in an argument among a band of thieves about
how to divide the spoils of rapacious plunder.
There is a lurking empirical claim in the debate about judicial review.
Critics are most comfortable positing the dignity of the legislative process
abstracted from the messiness of contemporary politics. Yet they nonetheless
are quick to point to legislative successes in matters such as Britain or Ireland
legislating a right to abortion as proof of the superiority of the parliamentary
route.70 And it may be that under certain circumstances, for those seeking such
social reforms, that “the British constitution provide[s] one of the best
opportunities for this to be done, particularly after the introduction of universal
suffrage and the reform of the House of Lords in 1911 and 1949 . . . . [T]here
were no institutional restraints on a legally sovereign legislature and a politically
sovereign electorate.”71 But where democracy yields one-party domination
along with ease of constitutional amendment, the historic legacy of
parliamentary sovereignty does not appear so rosy. For every Britain, there is a
Hungary or Poland or South Africa or India, as this Article develops below.
Nonetheless, it is hard to take issue with the general proposition that the
legislature is the preferred democratic route to govern in a democratically
legitimate system. It is so evident as to appear tautological. But cherry-picking
examples from political history fails to answer two questions that must be
addressed once the debate is moved from the premises of first principles to the
nasty world of human reality. First, how representative are these cases of
legislative self-repair amid the broad swath of experience under the imperfect
democracies that populate the world? And, second and more critically, what
happens when it is the political branches of government that threaten
democratic legitimacy?
A.

Taiwan

Let me offer a clear example of democracy-enhancing judicial intervention
from Taiwan. For much of its post-1949 existence, Taiwan was an unresponsive,
dominant-party state controlled and coerced by the Kuomintang (“KMT”).72
The democratization reforms of the 1980s allowed for some weak forms of
electoral contestation but always under the control of the KMT, which

70. See, e.g., Waldron, Core of the Case, supra note 8, at 1384–85; Jeremy Waldron, Legislating With
Integrity, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 389 (2004) [hereinafter Waldron, Legislating].
71. K. D. Ewing, The Unbalanced Constitution, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 103,
104 (Tom Campbell, K. D. Ewing & Adam Tomkins eds., 2001).
72. See Tzu-Yi Lin, Ming-Sung Kuo & Hui-Wen Chen, Seventy Years On: The Taiwan
Constitutional Court and Judicial Activism in a Changing Constitutional Landscape, 48 H.K. L.J. 995, 1002–
09 (2018) (discussing Taiwanese government history from 1948 until 1987).
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remained as dominant as before.73 All this began to change as the KMT’s grip
on Taiwanese politics began to slip in the face of the first serious political
challenges in the late 1990s. As established political power waned, the dominant
legislative parties in 1999 tried to cement their hold on power by passing a
constitutional amendment allowing them to, in effect, bypass electoral
accountability.74 Among the lock-in provisions put into effect were two that
stand out as an affront to any system of electoral representation. First, all
elections for the National Assembly, the constitutional chamber of the
bicameral legislature, beginning in 2000 were to be put off for two years—a
process by which the legislature voted itself a respite from electoral
accountability.75 Second, the seats in the National Assembly were to be
guaranteed to the parties with representation in the lower chamber (the
Legislative Yuan), without any direct election—a form of party entrenchment
again removed from electoral accountability.76 And, as if to confirm the
collusive nature of the power grab, the legislators were permitted to vote for
these changes anonymously—thereby undermining the accountability that
ensues from parliamentary public debate and voting.77
Having removed a large core of political power from democratic
contestation, there was no realistic prospect of a legislative solution. The
legislature that had just voted to keep the voters at bay was unlikely to restore
its own electoral accountability. What then of the prospect for judicial review?
As is often the case in dominant-party states, the Taiwan Constitutional Court
had remained generally passive throughout the period of exclusive KMT rule.78
And even as electoral competition began to stir in the 1990s, the court steered
clear of any direct engagement with political power, except at the invitation of
73. A concise account of this development may be found in TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW
ASIAN CASES 111–19 (2003) [hereinafter

IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES].

74. See Lin et al., supra note 72, at 1009–12 (discussing Taiwanese government history from 1987
until present).
75. ZHONGHUA M INGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU T IAOWEN [ADDITIONAL ARTICLES OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. X (1999), translated in Constitution of the Republic
of
China
(Taiwan),
OFF.
PRESIDENT:
REPUBLIC
CHINA
(T AIWAN),
https://english.president.gov.tw/page/93 [https://perma.cc/YPV7-H84E].
76. Id.; see PO JEN YAP, COURTS AND DEMOCRACIES IN ASIA 99 (2017).
77. See Yen-Tu Su, Political Antitrust: Rethinking the Constitutional Law of Competitive
Democracy 189–90 (May 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with
author).
78. See Rosalind Dixon & Samuel Issacharoff, Living to Fight Another Day: Judicial Deference in
Defense of Democracy, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 683, 705 (2016) (highlighting the increased importance of
“strategic judicial delay” in the dominant party democracy context); cf. Sujit Choudhry, ‘He Had a
Mandate’; The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in a Dominant Party
Democracy, 2 CONST. CT. REV. 1, 1, 3 (2009) [hereinafter Choudhry, ‘He Had a Mandate’] (noting the
difficult questions confronting the South African Constitutional Court in the face of the African
National Congress’s consolidation of power).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2019)

2019]

JUDICIAL REVIEW

19

the ruling party and then primarily for managing internal conflict.79 All this
changed abruptly in early 2000 when, for the first time, a non-KMT candidate
won the presidency and ushered in an era of full political competition. As
happens in many national settings, contested politics allowed the Judicial Yuan
more latitude in resisting dominant-party efforts to lock itself in power.80 The
Constitutional Court wasted no time seizing upon the fact of genuine political
competition to assert its role as the guardian of democratic institutions.81
Within days of the presidential election, the Constitutional Court issued its
decisive ruling in Interpretation No. 499, striking down the legislative efforts
at self-entrenchment despite the acts taking the form of a formal constitutional
amendment.82 Interpretation No. 499 is the first and only time Taiwan’s
Constitutional Court has invalidated a constitutional amendment.83
Regarding the process, the Constitutional Court noted that the
constitution’s “amendment greatly affects the stability of constitutional order
and the well-being of all people as a whole and, therefore, must be done by the
authorized [governmental] body in accordance with constitutional due

79. See YAP, supra note 76, at 95–96. The use of courts as internal mediating institutions for
autocratic regimes is surprisingly common and underexamined. Perhaps the most striking example is
the creation of a constitutional court in Pinochet’s Chile to arbitrate among the contending powers of
the military regime and thereby avoid the threat of repeated coups upon coups, as in Argentina under
the various military regimes from 1976–1983. In an extraordinary turn of historic fate, the
Constitutional Court then became a legitimating force that gave the precarious opposition the prospect
of organizing against Pinochet’s efforts to legitimate his rule through a popular referendum which the
court oversaw, and which Pinochet lost, thereby ending military rule. For a riveting account of the
Constitutional Court’s origins under Pinochet, see generally ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE JUNTA, AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION (2004).
80. See Dixon & Issacharoff, supra note 78, at 695 (noting how weakness of political parties or
other actors can “create space for other institutional actors (including courts) to act”).
81. The question of how far courts may go in challenging entrenched political authority is
invariably a matter of context and subtlety. See id. at 688 (arguing that “localized, context-specific
factors” determine a court’s success, particularly at second-order deferral strategies).
82. See Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 606, 607–08 (2015) [hereinafter
Dixon & Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism] (summarizing the unconstitutional constitutional
amendment doctrine as the idea that “some constitutional amendments are substantively
unconstitutional because they undermine core principles in the existing constitutional order”); see also
Wen-Chen Chang, Courts and Judicial Reform in Taiwan: Gradual Transformations Towards the Guardian
of Constitutionalism and Rule of Law, in ASIAN COURTS IN CONTEXT 143, 170 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & WenChen Chang eds., 2015) (analyzing the Constitutional Court’s basis for review of constitutional
amendments).
83. Compare Ming-Sung Kuo, Moving Towards a Nominal Constitutional Court? Critical Reflections
on the Shift from Judicial Activism to Constitutional Irrelevance in Taiwan’s Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 597, 603 (2016) (arguing that the court has been “sidelined in the arena of constitutional
politics” in the twenty-first century), with Lin et al., supra note 72, at 1014 (arguing that the court has
taken on a “role as the defender of constitutional principles in the face of social dissensus” in the twentyfirst century).
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process.”84 The court concluded that the amendment’s passage was not
conducted in a transparent and open manner and that its passage entailed
several “clear” and “gross” procedural flaws:
The provisions of the Amendment to the Constitution, as passed by the
National Assembly in the pre-dawn hours of September 4, 1999, were
voted upon in the Second and Third Readings by anonymous ballots,
which violated the procedure for constitutional amendments. Moreover,
the voting process had major flaws and was clearly erroneous because the
very same provisions had already been voted down during the Second
Reading but were brought up again in the Third Reading in a direct
violation of the parliamentary rules.85
Critically, the opinion did not stop with certain procedural improprieties
in the rushed effort to immunize a failing political order from electoral
accountability. The court also reviewed the amendment’s substantive
conformity with the pre-existing Constitution and held that
[a]lthough the Amendment to the Constitution has equal status with the
constitutional provisions, any amendment that alters the existing
constitutional provisions concerning the fundamental nature of
governing norms and order and, hence, the foundation of the
Constitution’s very existence destroys the integrity and fabric of the
Constitution itself. As a result, such an amendment shall be deemed
improper.86
The court found in the lack of electoral oversight the critical constitutional
failing, ruling as impermissible “any amendment designed to alter existing
constitutional provisions concerning the fundamental nature of governing
norms and order” that would compromise “the integrity and fabric of the
Constitution itself.” 87 At bottom, the court held, “delegates must be directly
elected by the people to exercise the powers and duties of the National
Assembly,” and absent such election, “the amended provisions on the
installation of National Assembly delegates violate the constitutional order of
democracy.”88
The efforts of incumbent powers to use legislation to thwart political
challenge is hardly new or confined to Taiwan. Numerous international parallels
can be drawn showing the propensity for those in power to insulate themselves
84. Judicial Yuan [J.Y.] Interpretation No. 499, JIESHI (Const. Ct. Mar. 24, 2000) (Taiwan),
https://web.archive.org/web/20171025024050/http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_0
1.asp?expno=499 [https://perma.cc/AD3J-R8AK].
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Kuo, supra note 83, at 600 (arguing that Interpretation No. 499 is “the foremost
example . . . [of the] constitutional politics” of the Taiwanese judiciary).
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from electoral accountability. The American experience with gerrymandering
is one manifestation but is hardly the most pernicious. Alexander Kirshner uses
the 1951 South African law banning voting by “colored voters” to introduce the
problem of capture of democratic processes for antidemocratic aims.89 A South
African court bravely resisted the National Party and held the law
unconstitutional, only to have its efforts overwhelmed by the apartheid reforms
of the constitution.90
In the face of shutting down part of the electoral process as in Taiwan, or
excluding internal opponents from the political process altogether, it is hard to
argue for the “dignity” of the legislative process, to borrow Waldron’s term.91
At a minimum, a thin defense of democracy is the avoidance of civil war because
the losers of today can emerge victorious in a subsequent electoral round.92
In Taiwan, no such deference to parliament may attach in the case of an
incumbent legislative majority that has used its power to suspend elections,
turned the constitutional chamber into a permanent fiefdom, and thereby
eliminated the electoral accountability that must form the core of any claim to
democratic legitimacy. As even Bellamy must concede, under such
circumstances, all bets are off: “If matters did indeed get so bad that the
democratic system could no longer claim to be either credibly representative of
political opinion or responsible and accountable for central matters of public
policy, then it would cease to possess the constitutional credentials described
here.”93 At its most basic, once elections are suspended or eliminated, it is
impossible to claim that there remain “incentives for incumbents to address a
wide range of disparate concerns in order to build a broad coalition of
supporters.”94
B.

India

The aim in this Article is not to catalogue the many parallel judicial
interventions around the world. But India does deserve special mention because
of the impact its Supreme Court has had on emerging democracies around the
world. The Indian “basic structures” doctrine was an early resistance to the
89. ALEXANDER S. K IRSHNER, A THEORY OF MILITANT DEMOCRACY: THE ETHICS OF
COMBATING POLITICAL EXTREMISM 12 (2014).
90. Id.
91. JEREMY WALDRON, THE D IGNITY OF LEGISLATION 5 (1999) [hereinafter WALDRON,
DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION].
92. See generally ROBERT A. D AHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 95 (1989) (“A more
reasonable justification for democracy, then, is that, to a substantially greater degree than any
alternative to it, a democratic government provides an orderly and peaceful process by means of which
a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing
what they most want it not to do.”).
93. BELLAMY, supra note 11, at 261.
94. Id. at 230.
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reaches of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s emergency measures.95 In
articulating the internationally influential doctrine, the Indian Supreme Court
placed certain core constitutional protections, including the right of judicial
review, beyond the reach of not only ordinary legislation but also of the process
of constitutional amendment itself.96 The nation’s Supreme Court concluded
that its review of proposed amendments for conformity with its constitution’s
basic structures is an implied limit on the legislature’s amendment power.97 In
using this new power to resist the state of emergency and one-party rule, the
basic structures doctrine “introduced the world to the idea of unconstitutional
constitutional amendment, a domain of values so central to democratic
governance that alteration was beyond even the power of the constitutional
amendment process.”98
When the government attempted to place constitutional amendments
beyond judicial review,99 the Indian Supreme Court then held the legislature
could not grant itself unlimited power to amend the constitution and that the
Supreme Court was competent to review amendments to determine whether
they were so radical as to destroy the constitution’s basic structures and thus
amount to a change greater than a mere “amendment.”100
The basic structures doctrine has been employed not only in response to
attempts to limit the Indian Supreme Court’s power but also in response to
amendments aiming to entrench executive power and evade electoral
accountability.101 For example, after the High Court of Allahabad found Indira
Gandhi, the recently elected prime minister, guilty of corrupt election practices
and barred her from holding office or running for reelection for a period of six
years,102 then-President Fakhrudeen Ali Ahmad declared a state of emergency,
95. SUDHIR K RISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND
OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE 225 (2009).

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY

96. See Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762, 814–15 (India). For a discussion of the
limitations on amendments trenching on structural protections in the Indian Constitution, see Madhav
Khosla, Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court: Towards an Evolved Debate, 32
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 93–94 (2009). For the doctrinal emergence of the basic
structures doctrine, see Madhav Khosla, Constitutional Amendment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 232, 232–50 (Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta
eds., 2016).
97. Golaknath, 2 SCR at 814–15; see also KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 95, at 24–26 (2009) (noting
the importance of implied limitations for constitutional amendments).
98. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 163; see also Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendments—The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 660 (2013)
(arguing that “the global trend is moving towards accepting the idea of limitations—explicit or
implicit—on constitutional amendment power”).
99. INDIA CONST. art. 368, amended by The Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1971.
100. Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 365 (India).
101. See Gandhi v. Narain, (1975) 2 SCR 354 (India).
102. Id. at 349.
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and the government passed an amendment that would have given Parliament
power to regulate elections, including the basis for judicial challenges of
elections, and would render previous legal proceedings adjudicated under the
old laws void.103 The amendment was challenged in the Supreme Court of
India.104 The court held that the amendment and emergency measures were
impermissible because they violated core principles like democracy and free and
fair elections, which are integral to the constitution’s overall design.105 Since its
early development in India, the basic structures doctrine, and other
substantially similar judicial doctrines, have been used by courts in India and
around the world to protect against both attacks on the powers of constitutional
courts and attacks on democratic processes more broadly.
C.

Emerging Democracies

Preserving the core basic structures of democratic accountability provided
the organizing principle for a dramatic series of decisions in recent years in
which apex courts have struck down even procedurally proper constitutional
amendments. The Colombian Supreme Court successfully rejected the
excessive concentration of executive power when President Uribe tried to
amend the constitution to allow himself a third term.106 Eastern European
courts slowed the process of political exclusion of governmental enemies
through lustration laws and language requirements for representation in
parliament.107 The list goes on, and the scholarship on judicial intervention in
such fragile or compromised democracies has become substantial in recent
years.108 At its most far-reaching, constitutional courts have developed a
103. INDIA CONST. art. 329, amended by the Constitution (Thirty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975.
104. Gandhi, 2 SCR at 349–50.
105. See id. at 350–51. For an analysis of the basic structural features of the Indian Constitution,
see generally KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 95, at 137–42. For a discussion of the necessary basic
structure principles featured in the Indian Constitution articles known as the “golden triangle,” see
generally Virendra Kumar, Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution: Doctrine of Constitutionally Controlled
Governance, 49 J. INDIAN L. INST. 365, 372–73 (2007).
106. For additional information regarding a Colombian constitutional amendment for election
terms, see Dixon & Issacharoff, supra note 78, at 716–19.
107. For a discussion of lustration laws and their application in various Eastern European
countries, see generally ROMAN D AVID, LUSTRATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: PERSONNEL
SYSTEMS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, AND POLAND 65–92 (2011).
108. See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 65–66, 147–49, 181–82 (examining Turkey,
Colombia, and South Africa, among others); Choudhry, ‘He Had a Mandate,’ supra note 78, at 2–4
(South Africa); Sujit Choudhry, How to Do Constitutional Law and Politics in South Asia, in UNSTABLE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: LAW AND POLITICS IN SOUTH ASIA 18, 18–44 (Mark Tushnet & Madhav
Khosla eds., 2015) [hereinafter Choudhry, How to Do Constitutional Law] (India); Melissa Crouch,
Dictators, Democrats, and Constitutional Dialogue: Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal, 16 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 421, 432 (2018) (Myanmar); Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Constitutional Law in
Latin America: An Introduction, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN AMERICA 3
(Rosalind Dixon & Edward Elgar eds., 2017) (Latin America); Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Tiered
Constitutional Design, 86 GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 438, 458–59, 501 (2018) (India, South America, and
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doctrinal framework for rejecting “unconstitutional constitutional
amendments” that, even if presented in a procedurally proper manner, so
challenge the integrity of further democratic accountability as to be rejected on
that basis.109
The Indian Supreme Court’s doctrine of preserving the basic structures of
democratic accountability then provides the framework for the assertion of
judicial challenges to one-party rule in countries like Malaysia, which again, as
in Taiwan, corresponded to the fracturing of the ruling party’s lock-hold on
power.110 In Malaysia, the Federal Court (the constitutional high court) even
ventured into the fraught area of religious authority, declaring that judicial
review and constitutional interpretation are “pivotal constituents of the civil
courts’ judicial power” and that “[a]s part of the basic structure of the
constitution, it cannot be abrogated from the civil courts or conferred upon the
Syariah Courts, whether by constitutional amendments, Act of Parliament or
state legislation.” 111 As with the initial formulation of the basic structures
doctrine in India, and as repeated in many invocations around the world, the
Malaysian Federal Court proclaimed its basic structure to invalidate a
constitutional amendment that would have stripped the judiciary of the power
to review and invalidate certain categories of legislation.112
Categorical critics of judicial review tend not to address the problem of
the “third wave”113 of democracy formation in which the background in
autocracy or ethnic conflict yields deeply imperfect democratic institutions.
Bellamy, for example, simply posits away all the work of modern democracies
in forging a democratic polity.114 In his view, political failure “tend[s] to arise
out of resistance by certain territorially based cultural, religious, ethnic and
socio-economic minorities to rule by a national majority.”115 In these situations,
“the absence of a common political identity with their fellow citizens within the
cultural majority may undercut a minority’s ability to form alliances with them
Zimbabwe, among others); Po Jen Yap, Courts and Elections in Asia, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ELECTIONS IN ASIA 1, 5–6 (Po Jen Yap ed., 2016) [hereinafter Yap, Courts and Elections] (East Asia).
109. Dixon & Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism, supra note 82, at 615–618 (detailing an
example from Colombia).
110. See, e.g., Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor, (2010) 3 CURRENT L.J. 507, 517 (F.C.)
(Malay.) (“Unless sanctioned by the Constitution itself, any statute (including one amending the
Constitution) that offends the basic structure may be struck down as unconstitutional.”).
111. Yvonne Tew, Courts and Constitutional Adjudication in Contemporary Malaysia and
Singapore 43 (Aug. 20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors., (2018) 1
MALAYAN L.J. 545, 587 (F.C.)).
112. See Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors., (2018) 1
MALAYAN L.J. 545, 587 (F.C.).
113. HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at 13–16.
114. See BELLAMY, supra note 11, at 233–34 (explaining that political failure arises from ethnic
conflict, not from lack of judicial review).
115. Id.
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on particular policy areas.”116 This domain is then excised from the argument on
judicial review.117
In the actual world of beleaguered democratic institutions, one cannot
simply posit away the difficult question of judicial intervention to preserve
democratic institutions and the prospect for electoral accountability. Not
surprisingly, resurgent autocratic rulers frequently find comfort in attacking
any accountability to judicial review.118 Holding political power becomes the
repudiation to judicially imposed constraints on legislative prerogatives.119 As
urged by Polish de facto head of state Jaroslaw Kaczynski, “In a democracy, the
sovereign is the people, their representative in Parliament and, in the Polish
case, the elected president . . . . If we are to have a democratic state of law, no
state authority, including the Constitutional Tribunal, can disregard
legislation.”120 Kaczynski rules from behind a commanding parliamentary
majority, dispensing with the pretense of even holding any formal position
other than being a Member of Parliament.121 From that perch, he has
116. Id. at 234.
117. Id. at 233–34.
118. See, e.g., Marc Santora, Amid Growing Uproar, Poland to Remove 27 Supreme Court Justices, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/europe/poland-supreme-courtjudiciary.html [https://perma.cc/MQ5S-ESQW (dark archive)] [hereinafter Santora, Amid Growing
Uproar] (detailing how Poland’s governing party harassed, threatened, and removed opposing members
of the Supreme Court). In fairness, it is also possible that an autocrat may capture the judiciary to
impose commanding rule, as occurred in Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro used the Venezuelan
Supreme Court to, in effect, shut down Congress after the opposition surprisingly prevailed in
elections. See Nicholas Casey & Patricia Torres, Venezuela Muzzles Legislature, Moving Closer to OneMan Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/americas/
venezuelas-supreme-court-takes-power-from-legislature.html [https://perma.cc/7DRP-S7VJ (dark
archive)] (describing the court’s unprecedented decision to suspend the National Assembly); Hannah
Strange, Venezuela Supreme Court Blocks Opposition’s Parliamentary Super-Majority in ‘Judicial Coup’,
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica
/venezuela/12076970/Venezuela-Supreme-Court-blocks-oppositions-parliamentary-super-majorityin-judicial-coup.html [https://perma.cc/7X5M-AN5K (dark archive)] (relating the court’s decision not
to seat three opposition legislators on the basis of supposed voting irregularities, thus denying the
opposition a supermajority). As a general matter, the courts are more difficult to capture because of the
time lag of judicial appointments. This is particularly so in parliamentary systems in which the head of
government typically is also head of the commanding legislative majority. Cf. Charles H. Koch, Jr.,
Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH . J. INT’L L. 1, 66 (2003) (noting that “the key separation
in the parliamentary system . . . is between the democratic institutions of government and the
judiciary”); Yvonne Tew, On the Uneven Journey to Constitutional Redemption: The Malaysian Judiciary
and Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 673, 678 (2016) (noting that the Malaysian judiciary’s
position in its 1988 standoff vis-à-vis the executive was seriously weakened by the fact that it was a
parliamentary system in which the “executive and legislature maintain[ed] a strong control over
government power”).
119. See, e.g., Casey & Torres, supra note 118 (describing how when the legislature attempted to
restrain Maduro, he used his supporters on the Venezuelan Supreme Court to overrule them).
120. Santora, Amid Growing Uproar, supra note 118.
121. See Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional
Populist Backsliding 10 n.45 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18/01, 2018),
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successfully dismantled the Polish Constitutional Court, purged much of the
Supreme Court, and forced the constitution increasingly to bend to one-party
rule.122
The role of courts in resisting democratic backsliding in weak democratic
states is the subject of my monograph on Fragile Democracies,123 an argument
that I do not wish to rehearse here. Instead, the aim here is to push the
boundaries of the arguments over judicial review beyond the context of
unconsolidated democracies as such. The pressures of institutional weakness or
design defects in established democracies brings the elements of fragility to the
fore even in cases that would meet the narrow boundaries of proper democracies
identified by Waldron and Bellamy. The experience of strong constitutional
courts in emergent democracies helps clarify a form of judicial intervention that
addresses not the output of the legislative process, nor the rights of individual
citizens as such, but the integrity of the democratic process that conditions
lawmaking. But the extreme frailty of nascent democracies may reveal a
generalizable tension in democratic self-government. In short, the claim is not
that the world is divided between fragile democracies and a handful of stable
ones, mostly emerging from the remnants of the British Empire. Instead, the
argument is that all democracies may become fragile under excessive pressure
on the structural preconditions for democratic governance, at least at times.
D.

The Democratic Heartland

While extreme, the examples from Taiwan or Eastern Europe or India
have a resonance in even the established democratic countries. There are
temptations for incumbent authorities to either bypass the formal accountability
structures that limit their immediate power (George Washington’s “cooling”
function)124 or to thwart the electoral mechanisms that, having brought them to
office, might well lead to their removal. Richard Pildes and I have referred to
the problem of “lockups” on power by incumbents as a major justification for
judicial intervention and also as a guiding principle for distinguishing
democracy-reinforcement from mere policy imposition by the judiciary.125

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491
[https://perma.cc/3L3T-9YZB]
[hereinafter Sadurski, How Democracy Dies].
122. See Sujit Choudhry, Will Democracy Die in Darkness? Calling Autocracy By Its Name, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 571, 574–77 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2008) [hereinafter Choudhry, Will Democracy Die in Darkness?]; Sadurski, How Democracy
Dies, supra note 121, at 18.
123. See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 10.
124. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
125. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Political
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648–49 (1998).
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When the American Supreme Court ventured into the “political thicket”
in the Reapportionment Cases of the 1960s,126 it was the failure of electoral
accountability that provided the key doctrinal justification,127 as it later proved
to be in Taiwan.128 The core fact of the political question cases of the 1960s was
that the American political establishment refused to reapportion political power
from 1910 on.129 As the population grew, urbanized, and welcomed new
generations of immigrants, the act of reapportionment would shift political
power from rural America to the numerical strongholds of an urbanizing,
integrating nation. Even Congress, despite an express constitutional duty to
reapportion after every decennial Census, refused to do so after the 1920
Census, 130 which confirmed the rise of the urban, industrial North.131 Absolute
power loves power, absolutely.
As the twentieth century progressed, the refusal to reapportion meant that
some counties had representation sixty times as great, indeed even one hundred
times as great, as other counties on a per person basis.132 Even though one
person, one vote was not yet enshrined as constitutional doctrine, there was no
question that the intuitive principle of equal shares among voters was in grave
disrepair. Ultimately what foundered the political question doctrine was the
sheer futility of seeking political redress for a political power grab. In the
seminal case of Baker v. Carr,133 Justice Tom Clark perfectly captured the
absurdity of a legislative solution:
Although I find the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the Equal
Protection Clause, I would not consider intervention by this Court into
so delicate a field if there were any other relief available to the people of
Tennessee. . . . I find none other than through the federal courts. The
majority of the voters have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket.
126. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 635
(1964); Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 658 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377
U.S. 678, 680 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 697 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 715 (1964).
127. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (“[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”).
128. See supra Section II.A.
129. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 25, at 165 (noting that representatives from rural areas
whose population had not increased were unwilling to reapportion their states, knowing that this would
lead them to lose power).
130. Pamela S. Karlan, Reapportionment, Nonapportionment, and Recovering Some Lost History of One
Person, One Vote, 59 WM. & M ARY L. REV. 1921, 1940 (2018).
131. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1665 (1993).
132. Id. at 1652 (noting the disparity of 41-to-1 in Reynolds v. Sims); see also PAUL T. DAVID &
RALPH EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE 3 (1961) (noting a
disparity of 987-to-1 in Vermont’s lower house).
133. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Tennessee has an ‘informed, civically militant electorate’ and ‘an aroused
popular conscience,’ but it does not sear ‘the conscience of the people’s
representatives.’ This is because the legislative policy has riveted the
present seats in the Assembly to their respective constituencies, and by
the votes of their incumbents a reapportionment of any kind is
prevented. . . . We therefore must conclude that the people of Tennessee
are stymied and without judicial intervention will be saddled with the
present discrimination in the affairs of their state government.134
Most often, the cases that command attention are judicial interventions
when the legislature has acted perniciously, as with the Taiwanese power grab,
or the South African exclusion of “colored voters,” or the declaration of
emergency powers in India.135 More complicated than a power grab through
legislative action is legislative refusal to act and a corresponding lack of political
accountability before the electorate. One of the obstacles to entering the
political thicket to confront the refusal to reapportion was the generalized legal
difficulty with acts of omission versus acts of commission. Yet legislative
passivity in the face of consolidating power may also be the occasion for critical
judicial intervention.
Brexit offers an instructive example. Each of the major parties was and
still is deeply divided on the question of European integration, immigration,
EU regulatory authority, and a number of subsidiary issues at the heart of
British political divides.136 The result was an ill-considered referendum. In
effect, this was a desperate gambit by a weak prime minister to compensate for
lack of parliamentary leadership to take charge of an explosive political issue.
The avoidance strategy was to stage a direct appeal to the population. Prime
Minister David Cameron, like many failing politicians, misjudged the times and
was repudiated by the voters. Cameron quickly departed the scene, and a
chastened and ultimately unstable Tory government formed under Prime

134. Id. at 258–59 (Clark, J., concurring). Focusing on the structures of governance also allows a
critique of courts that fail to address structural deformities of the political process. Much as Justice
Clark usefully distinguished areas of governance that are beyond democratic repair, the recent decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court on partisan gerrymandering shows that this distinction is not internalized
in American constitutional law. Rather than look to the issue of democratic integrity, all members of
the Court, under a variety of theories, would recognize only an individual right to vote in an individual
district and not any systemic harm from the non-responsiveness of the political process. See Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018).
135. See supra Sections II.A.–B.
136. See Sara B. Hobolt, The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent, 23 J. EUR. PUB.
POL’Y 1259, 1260 (2016) (“British Leave voters were motivated by anti-immigration and antiestablishment feelings. They also reveal stark demographic divides, as the less well-educated and the
less well-off voted in large majorities to leave the EU, while the young graduates in the urban centres
voted to stay. This divide between those who feel left behind by the forces of globalization and mass
immigration and those who welcome such developments is also a driving force behind the increasing
support for Eurosceptic parties on the radical right and left across Europe . . . .”).
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Minister Theresa May, who in turn was replaced by Boris Johnson in an as-yetunresolved crisis of constitutional proportions.137
Unable or unwilling to resist the wave of populist anger, the new
government announced its intention to implement the Brexit vote as the voice
of the people. The result was an attempt to disentangle Britain from the EU by
executive fiat. This provoked a major legal challenge in the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom, now formally disengaged from the House of Lords. The
Miller case prompted a remarkable discussion on the nature of British
democratic governance and the importance of institutional order. The inquiry
was thus: [The] Act envisages domestic law, and therefore rights of UK citizens,
changing as EU law varies, but it does not envisage those rights changing as a
result of ministers unilaterally deciding that the United Kingdom should
withdraw from the EU Treaties.138
That a weak government had appealed directly over the head of Parliament to
enraged voters did not alter the institutional commitments to the democratic
supremacy of Parliament. Nor could the Prime Minister invoke plebiscitary
approval as a substitute for proper institutional process:
The question is whether that domestic starting point, introduced by
Parliament, can be set aside, or could have been intended to be set aside,
by a decision of the UK executive without express Parliamentary
authorisation. We cannot accept that a major change to UK
constitutional arrangements can be achieved by ministers alone; it must
be effected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, namely
by Parliamentary legislation. This conclusion appears to us to follow
from the ordinary application of basic concepts of constitutional law to
the present issue.139
Undoubtedly, there would ultimately have been political retribution for the
entire Brexit imbroglio, including on Prime Minister May. Perhaps in the
absence of judicial intervention, the parliamentary leadership would have paid
the price for any ensuing dislocations and its failure to discharge the leadership
responsibilities under Britain’s parliamentary constitution. But in the
immediate political moment, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom forced
a political accounting. The court’s intervention did not predetermine either the
ultimate decision on Brexit or substitute for the political accountability of
Parliament. Instead, in a fashion that borders on the soft power of democracy,
the limited intervention aimed to reinforce the constitutional constraints
necessary for democratic governance.
137. See id. at 1259.
138. R v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [83], [2018] 1 AC 61
(appeal taken from N. Ir., Eng., and Wales), https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-20160196-judgment.pdf. [https://perma.cc/53V8-WPV3].
139. Id. at [82].
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III. THE SOFT POWER OF DEMOCRACY
Beyond the formal commands of electoral accountability stand the norms
of democratic governance that exercise a soft power over successive generations
of governors. Mostly these norms are boundaries of constraint as citizens and
governors come to internalize the critical elements of democracy: the acceptance
of the legitimacy of an opposition, the prospect that results will vary from
election to election, and the institutional limitations that provide for continuity
in the lived experiences of the citizenry. Just as no successful society can rely
on the express sanctions of law alone, no democracy can survive unless certain
norms of continuity and restraint in governance are accepted by the political
class. The idea of “regulated rivalry” between legitimate adversaries dampens
the risk of upheavals and violence in favor of “the legitimacy of ongoing,
managed, institutionalized conflict.”140
A.

Soft Power Under Threat

The institutional pathways of democratic governance serve to slow
demands for immediate satisfaction of the momentary majority. Such delayed
gratification frustrates populist insurgents for whom institutional constraints
are seen as an impediment. To the tempering effect of institutionalized political
parties come the independent, charismatic candidates increasingly untethered
to any governmental experience. To the labored processes of administrative
procedure come the demands for draining the swamp.141 To the separation of
prosecutorial power from direct political commands comes the chant of “lock
her up.”142 And, to the difficulty of working the legislative byways comes the
recourse to executive decrees.143 In large measure, these are the frustrations of
political immediacy that bedevil every new administration in every democracy.
The ship of state is cumbersome and alters course hesitatingly.

140. NANCY ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND
PARTISANSHIP 121 (2008) (invoking Edmund Burke’s framing of parties as regulated rivals).
141. See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 22, 2016, 8:41 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/811975049431416832
[https://perma.cc/DPT4PZT3?type=image] (“Someone incorrectly stated that the phrase “DRAIN THE SWAMP” was no
longer being used by me. Actually, we will always be trying to DTS.”); Donald Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(May
17,
2019,
4:00
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1129340814080040961
[https://perma.cc/T5DP6CAC?type=image] (“DRAIN THE SWAMP!”).
142. See Peter W. Stevenson, A Brief History of the ‘Lock Her Up!’ Chant by Trump Supporters Against
Clinton, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/11/22/a-brief-history-of-the-lock-her-up-chant-as-it-looks-like-trump-might-not-eventry/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/Y2J4-5R97 (dark archive)].
143. The populist frustration with the norms of democratic governance is examined more fully in
Samuel Issacharoff, Populism Versus Democratic Governance, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN
CRISIS ?, supra note 122, at 445, 445–58 [hereinafter Issacharoff, Populism versus Democratic Governance].
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1. United States
More is at stake at present than the normal difficulties of governing. There
is no escaping the efforts made to foreclose any possibility that the political
opposition might reverse the electoral trend. In North Carolina, for example,
the governorship has shifted pretty steadily between Republicans and
Democrats since the partisan realignment of the late 1960s.144 But in the most
recent such shift in 2017, Republicans used their legislative majority to attempt
to neuter the office of the governor altogether, thereby depriving the elected
Democrat of traditional powers of appointment and various normal trappings
of executive office.145 As with all classic lockups, the aim is to consolidate past
electoral gains and eliminate the capacity for political opponents to realize
power by changing the rules of the game.146 Thus, in December 2016, less than
two weeks before the swearing in of Democratic Governor-elect Roy Cooper,
the Republican-controlled North Carolina General Assembly passed a
significant package of restrictions on the powers of the governor, reducing the
number of state employees that the governor could appoint from 1500 to 425,
stripping the gubernatorial power to appoint a majority to the influential State
Board of Elections, requiring that appointments to the governor’s cabinet be
subject to approval by the Republican-controlled state Senate, and significantly
stripping the jurisdiction of the Democratic-controlled state supreme court.147
This process was put to a halt by the state supreme court,148 which ruled that
the legislation obstructed the governor’s ability to ensure the laws were
faithfully executed.149 Not easily deterred, the General Assembly then presented
multiple amendments to the state constitution, aiming to frustrate any exercise
of customary gubernatorial powers by a Democrat.150
144. Former North Carolina Governors, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/formergovernors/north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/EEJ2-HPSY].
145. See generally Trip Gabriel, North Carolina G.O.P. Moves to Curb Power of New Democratic
Governor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/us/politics/northcarolina-governor-roy-cooper-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/BT8L-Y5L3 (dark archive)]
(detailing the North Carolina Republican Party’s attempts to strip power from the Governor).
146. For an overview of the persistent manipulations of election rules to consolidate Republican
gains, see generally Michael Kent Curtis, North Carolina’s Sick Democracy: Racial Gerrymanders,
Political Gerrymanders, and Voting Rules as Tools for Partisan Entrenchment (Sept. 11, 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247292
[https://perma.cc/GM8P-6XMN].
147. Richard Fausset, North Carolina Governor Signs Law Limiting Successor’s Power, N.Y. T IMES
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/us/pat-mccrory-roy-cooper-north-carolina.html
[https://perma.cc/D7XZ-MAML (dark archive)].
148. Cooper v. Berger, 370 N.C. 392, 422, 809 S.E.2d 98, 116 (2018).
149. Id.
150. See Dave Hendrickson, Here’s a Look at North Carolina’s Proposed Constitutional Amendments,
WRAL (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.wral.com/here-s-a-look-at-north-carolina-s-proposedconstitutional-amendments/17715772/ [https://perma.cc/G28V-E5WD] (detailing the proposed
amendments).
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At the national level, one of the founders of the Federalist Society
advocated seizing the advantage of a Republican President and Congress to
increase by a factor of 2.5 the number of federal appellate judges, ram through
appointments, and seal the judiciary as a Republican keepsake for a generation
or more.151 And at the executive level, the norms against presidential
engagement with criminal investigations have been lost to repeated demands
by President Trump for the prosecution of everyone from Hillary Clinton to
current and former government officials who have aroused presidential ire.152
In the United States and abroad, politics have shifted from the mediating
institutional framework of parties to individual-based campaigns with a
decidedly plebiscitary air. One rather extreme variant is found in Italy, in which
an antigovernance group without a policy platform is allied with a right-wing
party rooted in anti-immigrant sentiment.153 To this may be added the radical
overhaul of post-1989 institutions in Hungary and Poland and the repeated
efforts in each to dismantle the judiciary as a source of resistance. 154

151. See Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Proposed Judgeship Bill 15–18 (Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch.
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, No. 17-24, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/calabresi-court-packing-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ5J-WHSV] (calling
for a significant increase in federal circuit judges).
152. Peter Baker, ‘Lock Her Up’ Becomes More Than a Slogan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/us/politics/trump-pressure-clinton-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/CZ4D-A5AH (dark archive)]; John T. Bennett, Trump Urges Sessions to Investigate
His Political Foes, ROLL CALL (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-urgessessions-to-investigate-his-political-foes
[https://perma.cc/4UHK-KBEZ];
Donald
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(Nov.
3,
2017,
3:57
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/926403023861141504 [https://perma.cc/CVL6-N6QN]
(“Everybody is asking why the Justice Department (and FBI) isn’t looking into all of the dishonesty
going on with Crooked Hillary & the Dems.. [sic]”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Nov. 7, 2018, 5:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1060155917059219461
[https://perma.cc/M8CZ-CLUZ] (“If the Democrats think they are going to waste Taxpayer Money
investigating us at the House level, then we will likewise be forced to consider investigating them for
all of the leaks of Classified Information, and much else, at the Senate level. Two can play that game!”).
153. See Alexander Stille, Not So Funny, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 2018),
http://alexanderstille.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Not-So-Funny-by-Alexander-Stille-The-NewYork-Review-of-Books-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7GZ-SG4Z].
154. See Patrick Kingsley, After Viktor Orban’s Victory, Hungary’s Judges Start to Tumble, N.Y. TIMES
(May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/world/europe/hungary-viktor-orban-judges.html
[https://perma.cc/K3ST-FNR8 (dark archive)]; Marc Santora, Poland Purges Supreme Court, and
Protesters Take to Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/
world/europe/poland-supreme-court-protest.html [https://perma.cc/5JJM-P3JN (dark archive)]
[hereinafter Santora, Poland Purges Supreme Court]. For a more extensive account of the recent illiberal
changes to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s
Constitutional Revolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA:
THEORY, LAW AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA 111, 111–24 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál
Sonnevend eds., 2015).
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2. Poland and Hungary
The experiences in Poland and Hungary certainly cast doubt on the
ultimate judicial capacity to intercede successfully on behalf of the soft power
of democracy. Each case presents a threat to democracy from within
recognizable processes and institutions of democratic governance, as opposed to
the sudden appearance of tanks on the streets. In this sense, it is important to
distinguish the risks of illiberal democracies155 of the twenty-first century from
the military diktat states of the past century. The presumptive legitimacy of
elections, even under compromised conditions, deters the more overt challenges
to civilian rule.156 At the same time, the hard challenges, particularly in the face
of anti-institutional populist sentiment, do not so often concern the formal use
of dramatic constitutional changes, as in Taiwan.157 Rather, more common is a
process of democratic backsliding that occurs when a democratically elected
government uses lawful tools to manipulate rules and institutions in order to
retain power. Instead of high voltage constitutional amendments, the tools of
“ordinary constitutional law, administrative law, and statutory interpretation”
may be the key levers to further “these abuses of public power.”158
Consider the experience in Poland since the Law and Justice Party (PiS)
won a legislative majority in the 2015 parliamentary elections. The national
judiciary proved a substantial impediment to the consolidation of power by the
controlling legislative coalition159—a playbook that readily extends from North
Carolina to Venezuela and beyond. Through a series of steps, including refusing
to fund the publication of Constitutional Tribunal decisions and then flooding
the court with new loyalist appointees, PiS loyalists numbered nine out of the
fifteen members of the tribunal, including its president and vice president.160
The subversion of legal authority was accomplished by avoiding a single,
comprehensive constitutional amendment and working relatively slowly and

155. See generally Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1997,
at 22, 22 (coining the term “illiberal democracy” and describing the problem of “[d]emocratically
elected regimes . . . [which] are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving
their citizens of basic rights and freedoms”).
156. See Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 15 (2016).
157. See supra Section II.A.
158. Sujit Choudhry, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendment: A Reply to Rosalind Dixon and David Landau, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. 826, 829–
30 (2017) [hereinafter Choudhry, Reply to Dixon & Landau].
159. Choudhry, Will Democracy Die in Darkness?, supra note 122, at 572–73.
160. PIOTR BURAS & GERALD KNAUS, BATORY FOUND., WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE
COLLAPSE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN POLAND—AND WHAT TO DO 6 (2018),
http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/ESIideaForum_Batory%20-%20Poland%20and%20the%20end%20of%20the%20Rule%20of%20Law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5U5Y-FHD6].
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through highly technical and procedural maneuvers.161 Wojciech Sadurski
argues that this set of moves “produces a cumulative effect” in which the “whole
is greater than the sum of its parts.”162 Each step was calculated to “ensure that
next phases would sail through without any scrutiny.”163 Far from satisfied, in
early July 2018, the PiS forced the retirement of twenty-seven of the seventytwo Supreme Court justices, including the top judge, through a law that requires
judges to retire at age sixty-five unless they gain a personal reprieve from
President Andrzej Duda, who has sole discretion over this retirement
provision.164
One need only look to Hungary to see the anticipated path in Poland. In
2010, with fifty-three percent of the popular vote, Prime Minister Viktor
Orban’s government seized sixty-eight percent of the seats in Parliament.165
This two-thirds supermajority allowed the unicameral parliament to
fundamentally rewrite the 1989–1990 Constitution and to pass large blocks of
legislation challenging the independence of the judiciary, the media, the
prosecutor’s office, the tax authority, and the election commission, as well as
extending the reach of governmental power into civil society institutions.166 Key
here as well was the neutering of the judiciary through forced retirements,
harassment, and outright threats. 167 All these incremental moves had the
combined effect of neutering the customary forms of opposition from within
the political process. The result was an increasingly isolated and weakened
judiciary trying to constrain the concentration of power in an increasingly
despotic executive.
B.

Judicial Intervention

The path to judicial invalidation of specific laws abrogating the structures
of democracy is well established, if difficult to execute successfully. Judicial

161. Choudhry, Will Democracy Die in Darkness?, supra note 122, at 576. For a comprehensive
account of the systematic assault on constitutional limits in Poland, see generally WOJCIECH
SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019).
162. SADURSKI, supra note 161, at 58.
163. Id. (quoting Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Farewell to the Separation of Powers: On the Judicial
Purge and the Capture in the Heart of Europe, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 19, 2017),
https://verfassungsblog.de/farewell-to-the-separation-of-powers-on-the-judicial-purge-and-thecapture-in-the-heart-of-europe/ [https://perma.cc/5WMK-H3GW]).
164. Santora, Poland Purges Supreme Court, supra note 154; see also Wojciech Sadurski, Polish Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court Under Pressure: What Now?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 5, 2018),
https://verfassungsblog.de/polish-chief-justice-of-the-supreme-court-under-pressure-what-now/
[https://perma.cc/7AGN-PEEN].
165. Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, supra note 66, at 549.
166. Id. at 549–50.
167. See Kingsley, supra note 154 (quoting Peter Szepshazi, a sitting Hungarian judge, speculating
that they “may have been approached by people . . . who may have conveyed the message that it would
be best if they stopped”); see also Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, supra note 66, at 549–50.
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interdiction of violations of democratic norms is less apparent than the more
established power to strike down offending legislation. Nonetheless, there are
some examples of judicial intervention that are aimed not so much at forcing a
direct confrontation with offending legislation than at restoring decisionmaking
back into normal political channels in such ways as to reinforce soft power.168
This approach of restoring normal politics helps capture the role of the U.S.
Supreme Court in forcing executive claims of national security exigency onto a
template of demanding congressional action to support and assume
responsibility for emergency measures. As previously addressed in work with
Richard Pildes, I have argued that this has been the key to judicial sign-off in
cases of war powers, along the lines of Justice Jackson’s typology in the Steel
Seizure Cases.169 Similarly, the Brexit decision in Miller v. Secretary of State can
be cast as compelling the proper forms of democratic deliberation in parliament
rather than the expedient of executive action.170 The Israeli Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Ramat Gan Academic Center of Law and Business v. Knesset can
be seen in a similar light.171 The Israeli’s Constitution requires that the
legislature reviews and approves an annual budget recommended by the
executive, and, when the executive branch attempted to change this to a
biannual review thus limiting the legislature’s oversight, the court intervened
and demanded a return to the normal procedure.172
There are mechanisms of what Rosalind Dixon terms first-order deferral
that allow a declaration of unconstitutionality or incompatibility with
controlling higher authority to place back in the hands of the legislature the
ability to reengage the issue after an adverse judicial determination.173 Examples
168. See supra Sections III.A.1.–2.
169. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 1, 32–35 (2004) (examining how courts use the institutional framework in Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown concurrence to adjudicate cases on alleged national security abuses). In Youngstown, Justice
Jackson argued the scope of the President’s powers depended on its “disjunction or conjunction with
those of Congress.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–35
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson advanced a tripartite framework, proposing that the powers of
the President are strongest when he acts with congressional authorization, at their “lowest ebb” when
he acts without congressional authorization, and in a “zone of twilight” when Congress is silent. Id. at
637.
170. See R v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [82], [2018] 1 AC 61
(appeal taken from N. Ir., Eng., and Wales), https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-20160196-judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/B54B-RCA5] (“We cannot accept that a major change to UK
constitutional arrangements can be achieved by ministers alone; it must be effected in the only way
that the UK constitution recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation.”).
171. See Yaniv Roznai, Constitutional Paternalism: The Israeli Supreme Court as Guardian of the
Knesset, 4 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE 415, 425–28 (2018) (Ger.) (discussing HCJ 8260/16
Ramat Gan Academic Center of Law and Business v. Knesset (2017) (Isr.)).
172. Id.
173. See Dixon & Issacharoff, supra note 78, at 687; see also Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance:
Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 43 (2016) (“After a judicial finding of
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include the Canadian “notwithstanding” provision174 and the European
community’s similar mechanisms for a legislative acknowledgement of an
adverse judicial ruling. In the European context, national legislatures may
recommit to the importance of the policy objective through “derogation.” 175
While each in practice aims to restore a constitutional balance (though the
Canadian power is almost never invoked),176 neither is directed specifically to
the less mandatory values of tempered democratic deliberation.
Pushing this judicial role a bit further are cases in which courts seek to
reinforce proper institutional byways and thereby reorient democratic
engagement, either by design or by result. Two examples from Canada and
South Africa illustrate the point.
1. Quebec Secession
Only twenty years ago, the fate of Canada as a nation seemed at issue.
Quebec nationalism was at its high point and the separatist Parti Québécois was
the largest political force in the province.177 The Canadian Supreme Court
confronted a question as fundamental as it was unprecedented: “[W]e are asked
to rule on the legality of unilateral secession ‘[u]nder the Constitution of
Canada.’”178 As with most democracies, the Canadian Constitution was silent
on the exact contours of Canadian democracy: “The representative and
democratic nature of our political institutions was simply assumed.”179 There
were no mediating principles in Canadian constitutional law or in general
democratic principles that could resolve the apparent conflict should a majority
of the Québécois opt for independence while a majority of the broader Canadian
constituency (including the Québécois) vote to preserve the territorial integrity
of Canada. Rather, Canadian politics had long subsumed a form of Québécois
separate representation through the reigning Liberal Party requirement that the
leadership of the party alternate between French and English speakers and the
party’s practice of setting informal quotas for cabinet seats between the two

unconstitutionality, a delay in the declaration of invalidity permits the legislature to remedy the
violation in the first instance.”).
174. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, § 33, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.); see Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial, and
International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 537, 543 (2005)
(describing the Notwithstanding Clause of the Canadian Charter).
175. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 15,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (providing a right of derogation “[i]n time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation,” to be strictly construed and subject to several exceptions).
176. Roach, supra note 174, at 543.
177. See ALVIN FINKEL, OUR LIVES: CANADA AFTER 1945, at 347–55 (1997).
178. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 263 (Can.).
179. Id. at 253.
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groups.180 The question was one of identity, rather than national oppression or
compelled subjugation—the customary fare of rights claims.181
The court eschewed first-order constitutional resolution (i.e., is there or is
there not a right of secession) in favor of reinforcing the capacity for democratic
political debate. The court’s intervention granted separatist claims the right to
initiate a dialog on dissolution of the country. In what is known as the “clear
majority/clear question” requirement, the court mandated that a majority of the
Québécois would have the right to initiate a process of political renegotiation
whose outcome could be secession, although those terms remained unspecified:
[A] referendum undoubtedly may provide a democratic method of
ascertaining the views of the electorate on important political questions
on a particular occasion. The democratic principle identified above
would demand that considerable weight be given to a clear expression by
the people of Quebec of their will to secede from Canada, even though a
referendum, in itself and without more, has no direct legal effect, and
could not in itself bring about unilateral secession.182
While unusual as a constitutional matter,183 the effect was to create mechanisms
of both popular consultation and legislative deliberation to defuse and diffuse
the mounting nationalist tensions, something that at the time had reached the
level of terrorist attacks in the name of Quebec independence.184
The threshold requirement of a clear outcome on a clear question, as the
holding was termed,185 was never put to the test. The last referendum in Quebec
occurred in 1995 and failed by less than 1.2%.186 But the capacity for democratic
discourse leading to parliamentary negotiations allowed for some needed
reforms and marked the end of the nationalist tensions in Quebec.187 By 2014,
the nationalist Parti Québécois became a minority even in the provincial

180. Brendan O’Leary, Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments, in
FROM POWER SHARING TO DEMOCRACY: POST -CONFLICT INSTITUTIONS IN ETHNICALLY
DIVIDED SOCIETIES 3, 16 (Sid Noel ed., 2005).
181. See id.
182. Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at 265.
183. See Sujit Choudhry, Popular Revolution or Popular Constitutionalism? Reflections on the
Constitutional Politics of Quebec Secession, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 480, 487 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Choudhry, Popular Revolution].
184. See FINKEL, supra note 177, at 194–95 (discussing the “October crisis”).
185. Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at 293 (“[A] clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in
favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other
participants in Confederation would have to recognize.”); see also Clarity Act, S.C. 2000, c 26 (Can.).
186. MARIO CARDINAL, BREAKING POINT: QUEBEC, CANADA, THE 1995 REFERENDUM 404
(2005).
187. See Choudhry, Popular Revolution, supra note 183, at 488–91.
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Quebec legislature,188 and Canada today has both a French-origin prime
minister and a francophone chief justice of its Supreme Court.189
Canada provides a useful and highly influential example of courts
respecting and reinforcing the boundaries of democratic politics. The court
sagely defused the sense of Quebec being aggrieved and used its constitutional
authority in the service of democracy. At no point, however, in the disputes
over Quebec was Canada at risk of descending into civil war or massive
bloodshed. This was the primacy of politics in a decidedly mature and decent
democratic society, which court intervention reinforced rather than supplanted.
2. Anticorruption in South Africa
South Africa’s Constitution fails to provide sufficient checks on unilateral
power, a defect that became apparent once leadership passed from the
enlightened hands of Nelson Mandela to the kleptocratic ambitions of Jacob
Zuma. In Westminster style, South Africa allows the same individual to serve
as head of the ruling party, head of government, head of state, and head of the
legislative faction.190 Once power passed to President Zuma, even the weak
institutional constraints on the executive provoked resistance. Repeatedly,
Zuma found himself in conflict with the independent public anticorruption
prosecutorial authority,191 the National Director of Public Prosecutions
(NDPP), which the constitution unfortunately allowed the President to appoint
pursuant to statutory qualifications.192 The statute said, among other things, that
the National Director must “be a fit and proper person, with due regard to his
or her experience, conscientiousness and integrity.”193 Shortly after assuming
office in 2009, President Zuma appointed a crony as NDPP, precipitating a
constitutional confrontation over whether the creation of an independent
corruption oversight agency would serve as a check on misuse of presidential
office.194
188. Official Results by Political Party for All Electoral Divisions, ÉLECTIONS QUÉBEC (Apr. 7, 2014),
https://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/english/provincial/election-results/generalelections.php?e=74&s=2#s [https://perma.cc/S8PC-GQUM].
189. The Right Honourable Justin P. J. Trudeau, JUSTIN TRUDEAU, PRIME MINISTER CAN.,
https://pm.gc.ca/en/cabinet/right-honourable-justin-p-j-trudeau [https://perma.cc/AL77-JTZA]; The
Right Honourable Richard Wagner, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, SUP. CT. CAN. (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id=richard-wagner
[https://perma.cc/QD4X6PAE].
190. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 83, 84, 86.
191. See Nat’l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at 284 para. 2 (S. Afr.)
(noting that the “litigation between the NDPP and Mr[.] Zuma has a long and troubled history”).
192. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 179(1)(a), (3)(a); see also National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of
1998 §§ 9–10 (S. Afr.).
193. National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 § 9(1)(b).
194. See Democratic All. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) at 254 para. 1 (S.
Afr.).
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Zuma’s first appointment was rejected by a Constitutional Court opinion
in 2012 notable for its assertion of muscular judicial authority in policing the
structural integrity of the constitution:
It is true that the functions of the National Director are not judicial in
character. Yet, the determination of prosecution policy, the decision
whether or not to prosecute and the duty to ensure that prosecution
policy is complied with are . . . fundamental to our democracy. The office
must be non-political and non-partisan and is closely related to the
function of the judiciary broadly to achieve justice and is located at the
core of delivering criminal justice.195
In the meantime, the incumbent Public Protector continued investigating
Zuma’s expanding fortune and, in particular, his efforts to transform his private
lands into a monument at public expense.196 In her 2014 report, the Protector
concluded that Zuma had been unduly enriched by the government coffers in
the form of improvements such as a “cattle kraal, chicken run, swimming pool,
visitors’ centre and the amphitheatre.” 197 The President thus had violated the
provisions of the Executive Members’ Ethics Act and the Executive Ethics
Code.198 Not to be deterred, Zuma and the National Assembly commissioned
an “independent” report by the Minister of Police that (not surprisingly)
exculpated the President.199
As evidence of the extent of corruption mounted, and as the Parliament
remained unable to resist the entrenched executive and the commands of the
ANC, the Constitutional Court issued a series of rulings whose cumulative
effect was to prod parliamentary action.200 These decisions were noteworthy not
for predetermining the outcome of claims against Zuma but for enabling the
legislative branch to exercise its countervailing authority.201 The decisions
required secret voting on no confidence motions and various protections of
minority rights within the parliament.202 When the issue turned once again to
195. Id. at 267 para. 26.
196. See Econ. Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly & Others 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) at
587 paras. 5–6 (S. Afr.).
197. Id. at 611 para. 76.
198. Id. at 587–88 para. 7.
199. See id. at 612–13 paras. 79–81.
200. See, e.g., United Democratic Movement v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly & Others 2017 (5) SA 300
(CC) at 326–27 para. 97 (S. Afr.) (requiring secret ballots on no confidence motions); Democratic
Alliance v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly & Others 2016 (3) SA 487 (CC) at 506 para. 45 (S. Afr.)
(criticizing the removal of minority members for engaging in parliamentary debate); Mazibuko v. Sisulu
& Others NNO 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) at 263 para. 45 (S. Afr.) (stating that the right to initiate a
motion of no confidence should be accorded to every member of the assembly); Oriani-Ambrosini v.
Sisulu 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC) at 604 para. 51 (S. Afr.) (protecting the rights of legislative participation
and speech by minority parties).
201. See cases cited supra note 200.
202. See cases cited supra note 200.
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the independence of the prosecution authority over corruption, the
Constitutional Court again interceded, this time ordering the President and
National Assembly to comply with the Public Protector’s findings and repay
the amounts wrongfully taken from the public fisc.203
The saga continued as Zuma did not repay all of the amounts owed,
attempted to appoint various cronies as NDPP, and finally sought to remove a
2013 appointee who had begun yet another investigation.204 Zuma assumed the
power to discharge any appointee and managed to obtain a pressured
resignation in exchange for a payout well in excess of the salary of the latest
NDPP appointees.205 Another lawsuit followed, this time before the High
Court, Gauteng Division,206 which wasted no time rejecting Zuma’s claim of
unilateral presidential authority: “In a rights-based order it is fundamental that
a conflicted person cannot act; to act despite a conflict is self-evidently to
pervert the rights being exercised as well as the rights of those affected.”207
Because the President admitted that he intended to use the processes available
to him to resist prosecution, he was obviously conflicted.208
Of more immediate interest is the decree that followed. The court reversed
all the efforts of President Zuma to control anticorruption efforts and ordered
that “as long as the incumbent President is in office, the Deputy President is
responsible for decisions relating to the appointment, suspension or removal of
the National Director of Public Prosecutions.”209 Further, the court declared the
unconstitutionality of the National Prosecuting Authority Act and offered a
rewritten Act that would cure the constitutional defect of allowing presidential
authority over an investigation of the President.210 But the court suspended the
statutory revision for eighteen months and referred the entire matter to
Parliament to cure the constitutional defect on its own.211
203. Econ. Freedom Fighters, 2016 (3) SA at 620–21.
204. Franny Rabkin, Zuma Had Been ‘Intent’ on Seeing Nxasana Leave the NPA, Zonda Commission
Hears, M AIL & GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2019), https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-19-zuma-had-beenintent-on-seeing-nxasana-leave-the-npa-zondo-commission-hears [https://perma.cc/YDP2-5M3N];
Mfuneko Toyana & James Macharia, South Africa’s Zuma Repays Some State Money in Home Improvement
Scandal, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-zuma/south-africaszuma-repays-some-state-money-in-home-improvement-scandal-idUSKCN11I16V
[https://perma.cc/DL3B-FZ4B].
205. Barry Bateman, Nxasana Was Paid Over R17M After Resigning, EYE WITNESS NEWS (June 3,
2015),
https://ewn.co.za/2015/06/03/Nxasana-paid-a-little-over-R17m-after-resigning
[https://perma.cc/5MFC-NGHE].
206. Corruption Watch (RF) NPC & Another v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others; Council
for the Advancement of the South African Constitution v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others 2018
(1) All SA 471 (GP).
207. Id. at 32 para. 112.
208. Id. at 32 para. 115.
209. Id. at 38 para. 128.
210. Id. at 38–39 para. 129.
211. Id.
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As with the Canadian court’s novel solution, this story also turns out well.
Once back in the hands of Parliament, the ongoing corruption scandals
compelled a confrontation with President Zuma and led, ultimately, to his
ouster at the hands of an awakened legislative branch and the ascension of
President Cyril Ramaphosa.212
✦

✦

✦

To summarize and to be clear: The world is filled with failed or failing
judicial attempts to thwart the descent of weak democracies into autocratic and
semi-autocratic rule. Hungary, Poland, and Russia are but some of the examples
of courts that have stood tall and suffered accordingly.213 And the world has also
witnessed captured judicial institutions serving to silence political opposition to
entrenched power, with Venezuela serving as the leading example.214 Tom Daly
well captures, with great skepticism, the curious demand that the least
democratic of the branches of government secure an incompletely realized
democracy, in effect “to transmute the base materials of a new democracy—an
incomplete political settlement, a nascent commitment to democratic rule, and
imperfect constitutional and international texts—into the gold of a functioning
democracy.”215
What is being offered is not by any means a certain antidote to the erosion
of democratic norms of governance, nor even a universal constraint. In some
high-functioning parliamentary inheritors of the Westminster tradition, courts
have crafted an intermediary role with stronger defenses of rights claims but
greater deference to the political branches to craft remedies.216 But in country
after country, particularly in times of political instability, the observed reality
is the insertion of the judiciary into the allocation of power among the political
branches. In turn, “[t]he central role played by the courts can perversely raise
212. See E.C.S., Why Jacob Zuma Resigned, ECONOMIST (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/02/19/why-jacob-zuma-resigned
[https://perma.cc/EV8C-T4A2 (dark archive)].
213. See Javier Couso, The Politics of Judicial Review in Chile in the Era of Democratic Transition, 19902002, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION 70, 88 (2003) (arguing that the Chilean judiciary’s robust use of judicial
review backfired by reducing judicial independence); Dixon & Issacharoff, supra note 78, at 689 (noting
that Russian and Peruvian court interventions only led to the “shuttering of the courts as institutions
and the increasing consolidation of autocratic power”); Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, supra note 66, at
551–53 (explaining attacks from the executive on the judiciary in Hungary and Poland). For a fuller
account of the paradox of increased judicial review in Chile after the 2005 constitutional reform, and
the backlash that ensued, see generally Sergio Verdugo, How Constitutional Courts Fail to Their
Makers? (Oct. 2018) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author).
214. See Casey & Torres, supra note 118.
215. TOM GERALD DALY, THE ALCHEMISTS: QUESTIONING OUR F AITH IN COURTS AS
DEMOCRACY BUILDERS, at xxii (2017).
216. See STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1–2 (2013) (examining constitutional developments
in Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand).
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the stakes in political battles over who controls the courts.”217 There are
sufficient counterexamples to undermine any claim to guaranteed outcomes,
and no guarantee of success is being offered here. Instead, as nicely captured by
Tom Ginsburg, the resulting paradox is that the “judicialization of politics has
led to the politicization of the judiciary.”218 The question remains whether the
expanded role of constitutional courts across the democratic world can usefully
be invoked to protect subconstitutional democratic processes on a sustained
basis.
This returns to the opening theme of the capacity of the judiciary as an
institution playing the role of a steward of democratic integrity, a role akin to
that of a central banker assuming regulatory oversight over a democracy’s fiscal
integrity. Such oversight at a remove from immediate electoral demands raises
the concern of the ensuing democratic deficit.219 But the ability of an
institutional buffer against democratic currents raises the prospect that perhaps
the judiciary is not the ideal candidate for the job. In the United States,
decisional constraints can be created not only through the federal government
but also through tightly orchestrated review through an entity like the Base
Closing Commission.220 In other countries, the function of overseeing even
politics has been channeled outside constitutional courts. Thus, the Mexican
transition to democracy relied heavily on the Federal Election Commission and
on the specialized Supreme Electoral Court,221 and in post-Francoist Spain, the
role was even assumed by the remaining claimant to the royal house, King Juan
Carlos.222 And in the wake of the near-complete electoral meltdown in the
presidential election of 1876, the United States Congress through the Electoral
Count Act sought to keep electoral oversight in the hands of a specially
designated body, rather than the Supreme Court.223
Even without claiming exclusivity for courts as institutional bulwarks of
democratic processes, there are nonetheless reasons that courts might be a
superior institution for this role. Courts are established sites for the resolution
of contested claims and have mechanisms relying on open public argument,
structured inquiries, and reasoned judgments that do not simply dictate results
217. TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 174
(2018).
218. Tom Ginsburg, Democratic Backsliding and the Rule of Law, 44 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 351, 363
(2018).
219. For a deeply probing and troubling account of legitimacy concerns over the role of the central
banker, by a central banker himself, see PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR
LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE, at x–xii (2018).
220. See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commission, 62 U. COLO.
L. REV. 331, 336–37 (1991).
221. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 206–07.
222. See Walther L. Bernecker, Monarchy and Democracy: The Political Role of King Juan Carlos in the
Spanish Transición, 33 J. CONTEMP. H IST. 65, 72 (1998).
223. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 652 (2001).
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but attempt to persuade. There are rule of law metrics for assessing decisional
results as well as comparisons to prior decisions by the same tribunal.224 Finally,
in most democratic countries, the appointment process for judges to apex courts
has some political accountability that keeps the judiciary within the broad bands
of the country’s political currents, something that a king in Spain or the military
in Turkey cannot claim.225 At the same time, the longer tenure of judges,
whether by term or for life in the U.S. federal system, allows the judiciary a
longer time horizon that allows an institutional distance from the press of
immediacy of intense political moments.226
In countries recently emerged from authoritarianism or civil war,
principled judicial exposition may help ease the ensuing constitutional order
from expedient arrangements that ease the transition to a fuller democratic
order. Courts in such circumstances both resist the pressure toward absolutist
invocations of universal human rights norms and also test the ongoing capacity
of restrictions on civil liberties to continue, with examples stretching from
Bosnia-Herzegovina to Colombia.227
IV. JUDGES IN THE BREACH
The erosion of the legislative branch as the fulcrum of democratic
governance is the most worrisome aspect of the modern day challenge to
democratic rule. This “decline of parliamentary sovereignty”228 breeds a lack of
policy initiative and a corresponding loss of capability of democratically
accountable institutions. Political power does not lightly tolerate a void, and
into the policy space assigned to legislatures have stepped the executive and the
agencies of the administrative state. As the competence of the legislative state
diminishes and the decretal and administrative powers of the executive grow,
the checking function of courts become more and more central. In turn, as
judicial intervention becomes quotidian, so too do the capabilities of the courts
and the comfort with a centralizing role.

224. My thanks to Jeremy Waldron for his help in formulating this account of specific judicial
competence.
225. For a discussion of the long-standing role of the military in Turkey as the appointed guardian
of bounded politics under the Kemalist constitution, see OZAN VAROL, THE DEMOCRATIC COUP
D’ÉTAT 3 (2017).
226. Many thanks to Pablo de Greiff for stressing the point to me that a broader view permits even
high stakes political issues to be fitted into a longer-term institutional perspective.
227. For an excellent account of the “peace jurisprudence” of constitutional courts as stewards of
fragile post-conflict period, see Jenna Sapiano, Courting Peace: Judicial Review and Peace Jurisprudence,
6 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 131, 143 (2017) (drawing, inter alia, on Bosnian and Colombian
jurisprudence among the examples of an emerging constitutional “understanding of the political
settlement that must be preserved for the constitution to continue to exist in any meaningful form”).
228. GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES, supra note 73, at 1.
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Loss of State Competence and the Risk of Judicialization of Politics

In some countries, the low level of state competence leads to tremendous
pressure for courts to assume increased managerial responsibilities as a stopgap
institution of last resort. In India, for example, the procedural vehicle of Article
32 of the Constitution allowing direct filing of injunctive claims in the Supreme
Court of India229 has led to famous interventions ordering the New Delhi Zoo
authorities to remove the overgrown monkey population from the leafy center
of the city230 or to order the removal of industry from the environs of Agra to
protect the Taj Mahal from environmental degradation.231 In effect, the
Supreme Court of India has become the forum for redress of admittedly
desperate social ills as fundamental as the breakdown of sanitary facilities.232
As courts stretch their reach into domains once considered the workings
of the political process, there seems a strong logic to not just measuring the
democratic inputs of the society but the outputs as well. Under the sweeping
rubric of social rights litigation, apex courts increasingly see in open-textured
constitutional commands an invitation to direct the deployment of societal
resources, a task ideally relegated to the policy-setting role of the legislature.
Legislative failure invites action. For example, the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has declared a right of “everyone to
sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for
229. INDIA CONST. art. 32(1) (“The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings
for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.”).
230. See J. Venkatesan, Supreme Court Shifts Monkey Business to Delhi High Court, HINDU (Feb. 15,
2007),
https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/Supreme-Court-shifts-monkey-business-to-DelhiHigh-Court/article14720898.ece [https://perma.cc/7YN4-U5U4 (dark archive)].
231. Over the past two decades, the Indian Supreme Court has issued repeated orders on
environmental threats to the Taj Mahal, ranging from the relocation of industry and crematoriums, to
the banning of non-electric vehicles near the Taj, to addressing insect infestations and discoloration.
All of this is done under direct mandate of the High Court. See, e.g., Eli Meixler, The Taj Mahal Is
Changing Color. That Has India’s Highest Court Concerned, TIME (May 2, 2018), http://time.com/
5262395/taj-mahal-india-change-color-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/QN8P-6ZZ2 (dark archive)]
(describing the Indian Supreme Court’s direction to state officials that they hire experts to restore the
Taj Mahal); Dean Nelson & Jalees Andrabi, Taj Mahal Falling Victim to Chronic Pollution, TELEGRAPH
(Dec. 3, 2010), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/8179446/Taj-Mahal-fallingvictim-to-chronic-pollution.html [https://perma.cc/A45M-NSPM] (noting a 1998 Supreme Court
order to protect the Taj Mahal from pollution); Samanwaya Rautray, Supreme Court Tells Agra
Municipal to Shift Crematorium to Protect Taj Mahal, ECON. T IMES (Nov. 17, 2015), https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/supreme-court-tells-agra-municipal-to-shiftcrematorium-to-protect-taj-mahal/articleshow/49805132.cms
[https://perma.cc/U5RN-H7MY]
(describing a letter by Supreme Court Justice Joseph requesting that a crematorium in Agra be moved
to protect the Taj Mahal).
232. In Wadehra v. Union of India, the Court read the non-judicially enforceable provisions of
Article 21 (right to life) and Articles 48A and 51(A) (environmental protections) to have been breached
by the state’s failure to provide social services. (1996) 2 SCC 594, 606–07 (India). Among the specific
ordered relief was the installation of incinerators in all hospitals with more than fifty beds, the
construction of additional garbage collection centers, and the appointment of specialized municipal
magistrates to promulgate new rules on waste disposal. Id. at 608–10.
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personal and domestic uses.”233 In Colombia, the Constitutional Court has
accepted this mandate as a constitutional obligation to oversee the requirements
and processes for the termination of municipal services. Beginning in at least
2007, when the Constitutional Court ordered the reconnection of water service
for a seriously ill woman unable to pay her utility bills,234 the court has
superintended the creation of “appropriate pricing policies such as free or lowcost water.”235 In highly detailed injunctive orders under its tutela power of
constitutional oversight,236 the court has struck down individual suspension of
water services for minors, for the indigent, or where the court deemed a breach
of a fundamental right.237 In effect, the court became the prime regulator of a
public function as old as the Roman aqueducts.
Brazil is perhaps the best example of the new judicialization of politics,238
combining discredited political institutions with ample rights guarantees
unqualified by the types of ability to realize constraints found in other expansive
modern constitutions, such as with the “progressive realization” provision of the
South African Constitution.239 Nowhere is this seen more clearly than with
233. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 on the Right to Water,
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 3, 2003).
234. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 17, 2007, Sentencia T-270/07
(Colom.), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2007/T-270-07.htm [https://perma.cc/
7X43-K7LB]; see also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 6, 2009, Sentencia
T-546/09
(Colom.),
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/T-546-09.htm
[https://perma.cc/6AQJ-BRTB] (“Pues bien, cuando el agua potable se destina al consumo humano
adquiere carácter de derecho fundamental y es susceptible de protección mediante tutela, dado que sin
ella se ponen en serio riesgo los derechos a la vida, la salud y la dignidad de las persona.”) (“Thus,
drinking water, when destined for human consumption, acquires the character of a fundamental right
and is subject to tutela protection, given that, without water, the rights to life, health, and dignity of
the person are placed at risk.”) (translation by author).
235. C.C., abril 17, 2007, Sentencia T-270/07, § II.4 (quoting Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 15 on the Right to Water, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 3,
2003)).
236. César Rodríguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669, 1669–70 (2011) (discussing role of tutela
power in social rights litigation).
237. See
C.C.,
agosto
6,
2009,
Sentencia
T-546/09
§ 5.1
(Colom.),
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/T-546-09.htm [https://perma.cc/P954-J5HJ].
238. See, e.g., Estefânia M. de Quieroz Barboza & Katya Kozicki, Judicialization of Politics and the
Judicial Review of Public Policies by the Brazilian Supreme Court, 13 D IRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE
407, 411, 411 n.8 (2013) (It.) (“Another aspect of the judicialization of politics is the enhancement of
the Judicial System’s responsibilities to decide on public policies matters, especially on those regarding
rights guaranteed by the constitution, implying the redefinition of the boundaries of other public
powers.”).
239. Compare CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (Braz.), translated at Brazil
1988 (rev. 2017), CONSTITUTE PROJECT, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Brazil_2017?lang=en [https://perma.cc/EA9L-U9VC] (“Education, health, nutrition, labor, housing,
transport, leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and childhood and assistance to
the destitute, are social rights, as set forth in this Constitution.”), with S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 26(2)
(“The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
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regard to health care claims for medication that is unaffordable to an individual
claimant.240 The stunning success rate of such litigated claims241 results in a
significant portion of the national health care system’s budget that “is used to
pay for judicially mandated medication and treatment.”242 In these cases,
Brazilian courts read the guarantees of Article 196 very expansively: “[A]n
individual litigant must simply prove that a health need, as described in a
doctor’s prescription, was not met, and the benefit will then need to be granted
by the state regardless of costs.”243 In effect, resource allocation has shifted from
the legislature or executive branch administrators to the judiciary, which in turn
may short-circuit the customary political debates about resource allocation in
favor of a “syllogistic” mandate that if a right is identified, an entitlement to
state-provided benefits must ensue.244 Conrado Hübner Mendes argues that
this shift from legislative to judicial resource allocation and rights protection is
not so much a practical necessity but the result of “the underlying quality of
constitutional scrutiny: it frames, in a conflictive partnership with the legislator,
the boundaries of the political domain.”245
Certainly, there are many examples of courts around the world venturing
into clear areas of social policy, parallel to the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court
ordering state-financed access to expensive medicines, or the Colombian
Constitutional Court directing a minimum provision of water to all citizens, or
the Indian Supreme Court assuming responsibility for how sanitation services
shall be provided. Courts have moved quite far from the expositors of negative
constraints on governmental conduct to mandating positive returns to
disadvantaged or disfavored groups, in the spirit of Isaiah Berlin’s famous
typology.246 In some countries, courts even hold hearings on issues of social
rights, assuming the power to become what Daly terms “positive legislators.”247
Nor is this confined to economically vulnerable democracies. Commenting
on the centralization of opioid litigation in a single federal U.S. court, the
achieve the progressive realisation of this right.”). In South Africa, the distinction between the granting
of the right in article 26(1) and the qualification of its implementation in article 26(2) led to the South
African Constitutional Court’s adoption of a reasonableness standard for determining whether the
government has fulfilled its constitutional duties in administering these rights.
240. See Mariana M. Prado, The Debatable Role of Courts in Brazil’s Health Care System: Does
Litigation Harm or Help?, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 124, 125 (2013).
241. Id. at 124 (documenting success rates higher than ninety percent).
242. Id. at 126.
243. Id. at 125.
244. Daniel M. Brinks & William Forbath, Commentary, Social and Economic Rights in Latin
America: Constitutional Courts and the Prospects for Pro-Poor Interventions, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1954
(2011).
245. CONRADO HÜBNER MENDES, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 99 (2013).
246. ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 51–52 (1958).
247. DALY, supra note 215, at 90.
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presiding judge, Dan Polster, lamented that the “federal court is probably the
least likely branch of government to try and tackle this, but candidly, the other
branches of government, federal and state, have punted. So it’s here.”248
Courts as competent gap-fillers for democratic governmental incapacity
presents a different set of issues than the normal accounts of judicial review.
This is not a case of fashioning judicial review to serve as a countermajoritarian
brake to protect discrete and insular parts of the society who cannot avail
themselves “of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities.”249 Nor is this a matter of relying on courts to bring to life an
“enlightened” vision of a society’s better angels, extending equal rights to samesex couples, for example.250 Rather, this is the substitution of judicial authority
for the ordinary, if complicated, role of other institutions of democratic
governance. Courts serving as the last available source of state competence is
not the customary justification for judicial review. But courts in the delicate
domain of allocating scarce public resources among competing social claims,
particularly once the courthouse doors swing open, raises deep concern for the
institutional competence of the courts. The very nature of litigation focuses
attention on the matters that happen to be before the courts, while the silent
majority of social concerns may find no exposition in a special case focused on
a specific kind of medical care or addressing a specific need for remediation.
Among other concerns, litigation-directed social policy may privilege those
causes or classes with the readiest access to legal resources and may actually
constitute a regressive reallocation of public resources.251
The loss of state competence in democratic societies252 pushes courts into
areas of state responsibility once properly reserved for the political branches.
The line between rights declaration and assumption of responsibility for
governmental functions has always been permeable. The equitable powers of
American judges issuing structural injunctions over the functioning of prisons
or schools certainly tested the boundaries between adjudication and

248. Transcript of Proceedings at 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 02804 (N.D. Ohio
filed Jan. 12, 2018).
249. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
250. Barroso, Countermajoritarian, supra note 28, at 109, 110, 138.
251. Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Harming the Poor Through Social Rights Litigation: Lessons from
Brazil, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1646 (2011) (“[L]itigation is likely to produce reallocation from
comprehensive programs aimed at the general population to these privileged litigating minorities
. . . .”). As pithily expressed by Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, “[t]aking rights seriously means
taking scarcity seriously.” STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 94 (1999).
252. This theme is examined more fully in Issacharoff, Democracy’s Deficits, supra note 61, at 485
(noting that one of the reasons for the “current democratic malaise” is “the decline in state
competence”).
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administration.253 But when the loss of competence is coupled with the erosion
of legitimacy of democratic politics, the temptation for judicial action appears
inescapable. The discrediting of the entire political class in Brazil, to take a
recent dramatic example, invites despair over the institutional capabilities of
democratic government to fulfill its most basic social mandate.254
Doctrines such as equity in the common law tradition, or amparo and tutela
in civil law jurisdictions, recognize the need for a power of the exceptions held
in the judiciary, particularly when confronting governmental misconduct or
incapacity. To this exceptional account of broad judicial intervention may now
be added the sophisticated claim of Justice Barroso that the need for judicial
intervention may not be exceptional but structural. The risk is that
transgressing the presumptive centrality of the legislative branch may invite
excessive judicialization of politics. Even so, on this account, the presumptive
legitimacy of democratic politics may be compromised through the public
choice set of “problems attributed to (i) failure of the electoral and party system,
(ii) party minorities that function as ‘veto players,’ obstructing the prevailing
will of the parliamentary majority, and (iii) the eventual trapping by special
interests.”255
The consequence for Barroso is a “democratic deficit of political
representation,” in turn serving as an invitation for judges to assert a vision of
the public good “not subject to the short-term volatilities of electoral politics.”256
For advocates of this vision of constitutional judging, including not only
Barroso but the German theorist Robert Alexy, constitutional judging becomes
a form of popular representation above and beyond electoral politics.257 Alexy
stretches this claim to root democratic legitimacy not in electoral results but in
“argumentative representation” such that “[a]n adequate concept of democracy
253. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 545 (2011) (upholding court-ordered reduction in
prison population); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455 (1979) (upholding courtordered desegregation plan); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1389 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 679
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that prison conditions violated the Constitution and appointing
special masters and monitors to supervise the implementation of and compliance with court-mandated
changes).
254. One indication is the approval rating of President Temer on the eve of the most recent
elections. As of April 2018, Temer’s approval rating had slipped to five percent, with seventy-two
percent of the population rating him “bad” or “terrible.” Lisandra Paraguassú & Anthony Boadle, supra
note 34. In turn, a right-wing populist won the presidential election, demonizing the opposition and
heralding the order of the period of military rule. Anthony Faiola & Marina Lopes, Bolsanaro Wins
Brazilian
Presidency,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
28,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazilians-go-the-polls-with-far-right-jairbolsonaro-as-front-runner/2018/10/28/880dd53c-d6dd-11e8-8384bcc5492fef49_story.html?utm_term=.a879854c80b4 [https://perma.cc/KMG7-N9SR (dark archive)].
255. Barroso, Countermajoritarian, supra note 28, at 129.
256. Id.
257. See Robert Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L.
572, 578 (2005).
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must . . . comprise not only decision but also argument.”258 Because judicial
decisions may be tested by reasoned public review, the correctness of such
decisions may afford democratic legitimacy separate from, and indeed often
superior to, that of the political branches.259 The publicity of this form of
argumentation then allows for an “indirect electoral link” to popular acceptance,
to use Mattias Kumm’s formulation.260
B.

Managing the Risk

At risk when the link to electoral politics becomes too attenuated is that
the judiciary will become simply a substitute for democratic politics. Once
armed with constitutional authority, emboldened by its reservoir of
competence, and then ennobled by the public choice insight about the risk of
capture of the political branches, there is the risk that the domain of politics is
limited to confirmation of first-order constitutional proclamations of rights. All
the more so if claims of “ex post facto popular approval” of judicial interpretations
by public acquiescence provide for no real measure of such endorsement of
judicial authority.261 Here I find myself in agreement with Bellamy that, under
such a broad claim of judicial power, the judiciary itself will become the
battleground for partisan strife, most visibly at times of contested judicial
appointments, and that battles over the judiciary will displace normal forms of
partisan contest through politics: “Effort will go into capturing the judiciary
rather than constructing a legislative majority by reaching a mutually acceptable
compromise with one’s political opponents. As a result, both sides become ever
more polarised.”262 But the risk potentially reaches beyond the question of who
sits as the judicial expositor of broad constitutional rights.
While there are many examples of increasingly pitched battles over who
are the judges, from the United States to Argentina, there are few examples of
judges so commanding public policy as to diminish democratic politics in some
258. Id. at 579.
259. See Mattias Kumm, Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial Review, in
INSTITUTIONALIZED REASON: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ROBERT ALEXY 201, 205–06 (Matthias
Klatt ed., 2012). For a distinct claim that the express role of the Colombian Constitutional Court
encompasses democratic legitimacy because of popular approval of that country’s constitution, see
David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 319, 344 (2010) (“The Colombian Constitutional Court’s striking institutional popularity relative
to other political institutions suggests that it has more democratic legitimacy than most judicial bodies.
The public sees the Court, rather than the legislature, as the best embodiment of the transformative
project of the 1991 constitution.”).
260. See Kumm, supra note 259, at 207.
261. Ana Micaela Alterio, Una Justificacion Mayoritaria del Control Judicial de Constitucionalidad: La
Representacion Argumentativa en la Democracia Deliberativa, in 1 ENTRE LA LIBERTAD Y LA IGUALDAD:
ENSAYOS CRÍTICOS SOBRE LA OBRA DE RODOLFO VÁZQUEZ 37, 49 (Jorge Cerdio, Pablo De
Larrañaga & Pedro Salazar eds., 2017) (Mex.) (translation by author).
262. BELLAMY, supra note 11, at 44.
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provable context. But an analogy may be drawn to the hollowed ambit of
domestic politics in the European context in ways that may serve as a caution.
Writing at the beginning of the populist upsurge that would bring to
prominence Wilders in the Netherlands, Le Pen in France, Podemos in Spain,
Five Star in Italy, and a host of more menacing figures in Eastern Europe, Peter
Mair cautioned that the centralization of increasing authority in European
authorities had voided domestic national politics of responsibility for
governance. The increased distance between electoral contestation and
governing authority made politics a choice grounds for increasingly demagogic
posturing with little accountability for subsequent governance. With broad
anticipation of how traditional European political parties have withered before
polar politics, Mair wrote:
As popular involvement fades, . . . and as indifference grows, we can
expect that even those citizens who do continue to participate will prove
more volatile, more uncertain and more random in their expressions of
preference. If politics no longer counts for so much, then not only should
the willingness to vote begin to falter; so also should the sense of
commitment among those who continue to take part. Choices are likely
to prove more fickle, and to be more susceptible to the play of short-term
factors. . . . Hand in hand with indifference goes inconsistency.263
And if the result of political posturing is that Spain is without a
government for months on end, 264 or Belgium even longer,265 not much matters
because ultimate responsibility lies at the non-electoral level of European Union
administration. When governance fails, Brussels may still rule Belgium, but it
is not the elected representatives of the Belgian citizenry who are making the
decisions. By analogy, the risk is that the judicialization of public policy may
similarly contribute to voiding out customary politics and even turn national
politics into a referendum on the judiciary. Certainly hostility to the European
Court of Human Rights has been an oft-raised theme among the populist right
in Europe, and the social rights rulings of the Colombian Constitutional Court
serve as the backdrop for political contestation seemingly far removed from the
actual rulings of the court.266
263. PETER MAIR, RULING THE VOID: THE HOLLOWING OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY 29
(2013).
264. See Tim Worstall, Spain Has No Government for 10 Months: Economy Grows, Unemployment Falls
to 18.9%, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/10/27/spain-has-nogovernment-for-10-months-economy-grows-unemployment-falls-to-18-9/#81f6954b62c8
[perma.cc/BY9P-UDB3].
265. Bruno Waterfield, Belgium to Have New Government After World Record 541 Days, TELEGRAPH
(Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/8936857/Belgium-tohave-new-government-after-world-record-541-days.html [[https://perma.cc/49E4-4JM2].
266. See Sibyella Brodzinski, Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject Peace Deal with FARC Guerillas,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-
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Here too there is an intermediary position akin to the processreinforcement of the Canadian and South African courts in the context of
governing structures. Courts faced with grave questions of subsistence and
other first-order policy questions do at times simply assume the role of a quasilegislature and create, in effect, a new administrative body under judicial
mandate.267 But courts can also interpret existing laws and decrees to force the
government to meet the burden of its existing obligations, or courts can compel
the government to take up an issue of contested social rights under threat of
judicial intervention.268 Thus, Po Jen Yap usefully distinguishes between
judicial interventions that substitute for the failure of the political process to
address a social need, those that force greater implementation of pre-existing
social programs, and those that compel the government to take up the contested
issue and assume political responsibility for its resolution.269 Confined judicial
intervention may even be more rights-enabling than substitution for the
political process altogether.270
1. Brazil
An example from Brazil shows the difficulty of courts trying to weigh the
costs and benefits of competing claims for limited societal resources. In 2016,
the STF ordered the impoverished state of Rio Grande do Norte to provide an
individual claimant free access to the drug Sildenafil, notwithstanding the
$5000 USD price tag for each box of medication.271 Viewed as a question of
individual entitlement, such decisions betray an absence of “normative
criteria”272 for assessing competing claims to scarce resources. There are also
serious concerns not just of distribution of public resources but of allocation, as
rejects-peace-deal-with-farc [https://perma.cc/FL23-4HFD] (describing intense political contestation
in Colombia).
267. See, e.g., infra Section IV.B.3 (discussing India’s Supreme Court use of a constitutional
provision to take on administrative authorities).
268. This has been a frequent form of Supreme Court intervention in India. See Shylashri Shankar
& Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE:
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 146,
174 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008).
269. See Po Jen Yap, Remedial Discretion and Dilemmas in Asia, 70 U. T ORONTO L.J. (forthcoming
2020).
270. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857,
889 (1999) (“[R]aising the ‘price’ of a constitutional violation by enhancing the remedy will, all things
being equal, result in fewer violations.”).
271. STF, RE No. 566471 RN, Relator: Marco Aurélio, 28.09.2016, Diário da Justiça Eletrônico
[D.J.e.], 09.30.2016, 209 (Braz.) (translation by author).
272. Vanice R. Lirio de Valle, Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights Through Immediate Efficacy: A Case
Study of Rio de Janeiro’s Right to Housing, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 27, 30 (2016) (remarking that
the development of mass litigation “leads to a non-differentiation tendency in ruling” and that “[d]etails
about the factual framework tend to be lost, and judges would usually develop a certain decisional
matrix that would be mechanically applied”).
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wealthier individuals more capable of maneuvering in the legal system may
siphon off state resources by demanding free state-provided medication.273
In dissent, Justice Barroso offered two alternative paths. First, he noted
that there should be mechanisms to check the public health decisions made by
state officials in terms of the efficacy of alternative medications, the availability
of lower cost substitutes, and a range of other considerations that might channel
the judicial rights inquiry into the more traditional pathways of cost-benefit
regulatory oversight.274 More central to this inquiry, however, is the second
approach offered by Justice Barroso. Rather than rushing to implement a
remedy under the broad mantle of rights jurisprudence, Barroso urges courts to
draw in state regulators, including experts from the public health system, to
focus government attention on the health issues before the courts.275 By contrast
to the first-order rights claims, such a procedural vehicle would compel public
authorities to engage in public policy dialogue.276 The approach follows a focus
on court intervention to “open up public institutions that have chronically failed
to meet their obligations and that are substantially insulated from the normal
processes of political accountability.”277
What distinguishes this process-reinforcing approach from simple rights
proclamation is the engagement of the political branches to discharge their
duties of democratic governance. The aim is to compel political engagement
with pressing social issues, particularly on behalf of the most vulnerable
members of the society but without predetermining the outcome of that
engagement. In effect, this is the same posture for judicial intervention as the
process-driven reinforcement of democratic soft power already seen in the
examples from Canada and South Africa in the domain of democratic
governance.

273. See generally Brinks & Forbath, supra note 244, at 1952 (reviewing recent scholarship that
suggests that health care litigation may be exacerbating, rather than alleviating, economic inequality).
274. See STF, RE No. 566471 RN, at paras. 3–4 (Barroso, J., dissenting) (translation by author).
275. See id. at para. 4 (translation by author).
276. Barroso’s role as judge dovetails here with his constitutional scholarship on the role of courts
as part of a larger dialogic constitutional apparatus. See Barroso, Reason Without Vote, supra note 28, at
88 (“What can be drawn from that final note is that the current model cannot be characterized as
judicial supremacy. The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court . . . does not own the Constitution. . . . A
loss of dialogue with society, the potential inability to justify its decisions or to be understood, would
undercut compliance with and legitimacy by the Court.”).
277. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 H ARV. L. REV. 1015, 1020 (2004).
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2. South Africa
The South African Constitution, through sections 26 and 27,278 guarantees
a right to housing and to health care, food, and social security.279 These rights
are justiciable280 and may be invoked by individual litigants, as in Brazil. Both
of these provisions are qualified, however, by considerations of reasonableness
and adequacy of resources: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation
of each of these rights.”281
In Government of South Africa v. Grootboom,282 the Constitutional Court
distinguished the rights guarantees from the necessary deference to political
authorities for the actual policies taken to implement the constitutional
protections.283 At issue was a land seizure by squatters who rightly claimed
government unresponsiveness to their need for housing relief.284 Unlike the
blanket Brazilian order to provide a needed medication, the court asked about
the reasonableness of the government’s overall decisions285 and acknowledged
“that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet
its obligations.” 286 This reasonableness inquiry of necessity must be “extremely
context-sensitive,”287 allowing the court to condemn the government for its
complete inaction “in that it failed to provide for any form of relief to those
desperately in need of access to housing” and requiring policy development “to
devise, fund, implement and supervise measures to provide relief to those in
desperate need.”288

278. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 26(1), 27(1).
279. Id.; see also Mark S. Kende, The Fifth Anniversary of the South African Constitutional Court: In
Defense of Judicial Pragmatism, 26 VT. L. REV. (2002) 753, 755–56, 756 n.19 (noting the influence of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the South African Constitution’s
elaboration of socioeconomic rights).
280. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 25 (S. Afr.).
(“The question in the present case, therefore, is not whether socio-economic rights are justiciable.
Clearly they are.” (citations omitted)).
281. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 26(2), 27(2). Note that section 28, on the rights guaranteed to
children, does not contain an equivalent limiting subsection. See id. § 28.
282. Gov’t of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
283. See id. at para. 32.
284. Id. at paras. 6–9.
285. Id. at para. 33; see also id. at para. 41 (“In any challenge based on section 26 in which it is
argued that the state has failed to meet the positive obligations imposed upon it by section 26(2), the
question will be whether the legislative and other measures taken by the state are reasonable.”).
286. Id. at para. 41.
287. Theunis Roux, Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 7 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 106, 136 (2009).
288. Grootboom (11) BCLR at paras. 95–96. Whether this order actually helped the respondents is
debatable. See generally Kameshni Pillay, Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement
of Socio-Economic Rights, 6 LAW DEMOCRACY & DEV. 255, 276 (2002) (arguing that, in the wake of
Grootboom, the lives of the shanty-town residents had not appreciably improved).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2019)

54

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

The Court rejected an alternative claim for judicial declaration of a
“minimum core” of housing entitlements as beyond judicial competence:
It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the
progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing without
first identifying the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such a
right. These will vary according to factors such as income,
unemployment, availability of land and poverty. . . . All this illustrates
the complexity of the task of determining a minimum core obligation for
the progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing
without having the requisite information on the needs and the
opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. The committee developed
the concept of minimum core over many years of examining reports by
reporting states. This Court does not have comparable information.289
While critics would no doubt have preferred the categorical elaboration of
rights,290 as in Brazil, the South African approach forces onto the legislative
agenda a more transparent engagement with resource claims by those at risk of
political disregard. In such cases, “the greatest reasons for restraint” have been
the product of the novelty of the rights claims “not in relation to the idea that
citizens have socio-economic entitlements against the state, but in relation to
issues of implementation.”291
3. India
Alternatively, apex courts may attempt to ground rights in broader
constitutional guarantees while using underenforced legislation as the remedial
framework. As a practical matter, there is every reason to believe that “litigating
on the basis of the government’s own standards is a very powerful tactic, and
any attempt by government to repeal or roll back its own standards will be both
conspicuous and ripe for challenge as a retrogressive step.”292 For example, the
289. Grootboom (11) BCLR at para. 32 (rejecting the minimum core approach, in part, because the
Court does not have access to enough facts to take into account all the variable factors affecting housing
shortages in South Africa).
290. See, e.g., David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonableness Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the
Foundations for Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (2003)
(claiming that “[a]t present, reasonableness seems to stand in for whatever the Court regards as
desirable features of state policy” and asserting that “the Court has to develop and stipulate a specific
meaning for this broad, amorphous concept”); Ania Kwadrans, Socioeconomic Rights Adjudication in
Canada: Can the Minimum Core Help in Adjudicating the Rights to Life and Security of the Person Under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?, 25 J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 78, 89–90, 90 (2016) (discussing the
model of South African jurisprudence and its aftermath as emblematic of the danger of “refusing to
ascribe substantive content” to socioeconomic rights); Pillay, supra note 288, at 276 (arguing that, in
the wake of Grootboom, the lives of the shanty-town residents had not appreciably improved).
291. JAMES FOWKES, BUILDING THE CONSTITUTION: THE PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 240 (2016).
292. Id. at 267.
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Indian Supreme Court addressed threatened mass starvation in Rajasthan under
the judicially unenforceable constitutional guarantees of Article 21 (“No person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law”) and Article 47 (“The State shall regard the raising of the
level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement
of public health as among its primary duties”).293 Rather than circumvent the
absence of a constitutional enforcement mechanism, the court accepted the
constitutional mandate as a declaration of fundamental social policy. That
constitutional interpretation then allowed the court to look to legislative
enactments in light of the constitutional commitment. In the specifics of the
decision, the court drew its specific remedial authority from the statutory
Famine Code in Rajasthan294 and issued dozens of interim administrative orders
that were to be implemented through the overall statutory framework.
Ultimately, court supervision terminated in 2017, following more
comprehensive legislative action: “In view of the passage of the National Food
Security Act, 2013, nothing further survives in this petition. It is accordingly
disposed of.”295
The contrast is between engaging a one-off claim for resources as a straight
matter of individual entitlement and compelling the political branches to take
responsibility for social welfare. This is well-captured in the South African
Constitutional Court’s general “emphasis on assessing social policies and
programs to ensure that they take adequate account of the needs and
circumstances of the most disadvantaged, its readiness to prod government to

293. In People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (PUCL), the Court addressed famine
conditions in Rajasthan under the authority of Article 21 and Article 47. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196
of 2001 (India), http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/petition.html [https://perma.cc/G7N8-H9YE]
(initial petition); see also Yamini Jaishankar & Jean Dreze, Supreme Court Orders on the Right to Food: A
Tool
for
Action,
RIGHT
TO
FOOD
CAMPAIGN
3
(Oct.
2005),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/27433.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ87-UECM] (explaining how Article
47 relates to the right to food in India). Although the specific command of Article 47 is not a judicially
enforceable guarantee, the court nonetheless issued dozens of decrees running from 2001 until 2017.
These decrees covered grain allocation, obligations of ration shops to remain open and provide food
for families below the poverty line, free food provisions for disabled and other destitute citizens, and
school lunch programs. See People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors, In the Supreme Court
of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001, INT’L NETWORK FOR ECON.,
SOC. & CULTURAL RTS., https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2006/peoples-union-civil-liberties-vunion-india-ors-supreme-court-india-civil-original [https://perma.cc/VL4U-HSLM].
294. See, e.g., OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 846 (2d ed. 2014) ((“Our attention has been drawn to the Famine Code
. . . . That Famine Code, we are informed, is the one formulated by State of Rajasthan and similar
Codes have been formulated by other States . . . . [W]e direct the implementation of the Famine Code
for the period May, June and July, 2003 . . . .” (quoting PUCL, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001
(May 2, 2003) (interim order)).
295. See PUCL, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001 (Feb. 2, 2017) (interim decision),
https://www.sci.gov.in/jonew/ropor/rop/all/901064.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ24-LZX5].
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implement such changes, and its chariness toward individual claims for direct
relief.”296
CONCLUSION
Few contests in life are fully self-regulating. Even markets premised on
freedom of contract need overseers to prevent untoward manipulations. I
confess to little patience for first-order claims of the primacy of legislative
politics that cannot be tested against the lived experience of democratic
governments today. The period since the end of the Soviet empire has yielded
more democracies than at any time in human history and has allowed more
humans to have a say in the election of their governors than ever before. At the
same time, these democracies suffer the loss of the governing drive of the
legislative branches, the collapse of their historic political parties, and increased
populist demands to unwind their institutions. In some older democracies, these
are venerated institutions of governance; in other younger counterparts, they
arise in countries still trying to shake off the legacies of not quite forgotten old
autocratic regimes. To speak glowingly of a halcyon English parliamentary past
in the cossetted days of the British empire has little to offer debates around the
world or even in Britain today.
The premise of Fragile Democracies was that constitutional courts could ill
afford to be passive night watchmen over democracies in formation. For the
suddenly emerged efforts at popular sovereignty cobbled from the collapse of
autocratic states, the institutions were too vulnerable to permit courts to check
only partisan excesses. Instead, the core workings of democratic institutions had
to be nurtured so that the habits of democratic governance could take hold.
Courts had to learn “to intervene to constitutionally valuable ends.”297
Dividing the world between the newly-installed fragile democracies and
the stable regimes in the United States and Europe may have been error. It may
be that all democracies carry the seeds of their own fragility, with the older
states being distinguished by having greater protective institutional
guardrails.298 The era of rising populist anger and the dysfunction of modern
democracies is hopefully transitory. For as long as these moments last, however,
there is greater pressure for judicial engagement with the institutional
foundations of democratic governance. Whether the threat is to institutions or
norms, or whether it is as a result of other branches’ inability or unwillingness
to act in the best interest of democracy, the judiciary may emerge as the last
best hope for the preservation of the basic structures of democracy. This may
296. Brinks & Forbath, supra note 244, at 1952.
297. FOWKES, supra note 291, at 349.
298. I thank Ira Katznelson for this helpful formulation of democratic fragility as a condition at a
given point in time rather than a characteristic of one state versus another.
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not be the first, best world of perfectly functioning legislative politics. On the
other hand, humans were forced from Eden a long time ago and have adapted
to decidedly second-best arrangements.
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